Dr. Pedro Noguera is a professor of education at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also past president of the Berkeley School Board. His in depth analysis of the causes of and assessment of succesful programs for reducing and preventing youth violence is published here by In Motion Magazine as a series of hyper-linked articles which can be downloaded in segments. All sections can be reached from this page, or readers can follow from one section to another. The portrait of Dr. Noguera is by freelance photographer Kathy Sloane (kataphoto@aol.com).
The article was originally published in the summer of 1995 by the Harvard Ed. review.
Published in In Motion Magazine April 28, 1996.
Introduction
As the number of violent crimes committed by young people under the age of 18
has increased in recent years, the problem of youth violence has been elevated
to an issue of national concern. Since 1980, the number of violent crimes
committed by juveniles has climbed steadily; between 1984 and 1993, the number
of juveniles arrested for violent offenses increased by nearly 68%. *1
(This figure is particularly alarming given that many incidents of violence are
not reported to the police.) *2
The extent of the problem is further indicated by the fact that since 1989, the
homicide rate for juveniles has exceeded the adult rate, and since 1980, the
juvenile arrest rate for all types of violent crimes has surpassed the rate
recorded for adults. *3
Young people are not only increasingly more likely to be perpetrators of
violence, but are also much more likely to be the victims of violent crime. *4
For every category of violent crime, young people between the ages of 12 and 18
are more likely to be victims than any other age group. *5
The rate of victimization is highest among minority youth-- African-American
youth are six times more likely to be victims of homicide than their white
counterparts *6
-- but for all young people, homicide is surpassed only by suicide as the
leading cause of death. *7
As incidents of violence involving youth have increased, public demands for
effective measures aimed at curtailing youth violence have grown commensurately.
At the state and national levels, the response from policymakers to the surge in
youth violence has primarily come in the form of "get tough" measures,
including substantial increases in funding for law enforcement and corrections,
and increased penalties for juveniles convicted of offenses involving the use of
violence. Curfews targeted at teenagers and a variety of measures intended to
improve school safety have also been adopted in cities throughout the country. *8
As a result of these initiatives, there has been a steady increase in the arrest
rate for juveniles convicted of committing violent crimes. Since 1984, the
juvenile arrest rate for violent crimes in California has increased 53%, *9
and conservative estimates project a continued increase, of as much as 29%, over
the next ten years. *10
Despite this increase, public perceptions and concerns about youth violence have
not been quelled, and the sense of urgency to find solutions remains high.
This paper attempts to contribute to the search for solutions to the problem of
youth violence. After beginning with a critical examination of some of the more
popular strategies for reducing and preventing youth violence, I will explain
why these measures have generally not succeeded and analyze the solutions that
have emerged in criminology, psychology, and public health. I will then examine
the means by which violence has been normalized and how it is perceived in youth
culture, particularly in economically depressed minority communities. Finally, I
will present a case-study analysis of three programs that have been successful
in reducing youth violence, focusing on those characteristics that are most
essential to the development of effective local responses to youth violence.
Although several states are experimenting with alternatives to the traditional
approaches used to deal with violent juvenile offenders, old methods of social
control still tend to dominate most state and federal policies. Generally, this
approach is characterized by (1) the deployment of special units within local
police departments targeted at youth gangs, schools and areas where young people
congregate and socialize; (2) the enactment of stiffer penalties for convicted
juvenile felons and more rigid sentencing guidelines for judges; and (3)
reliance on large correctional facilities for detention and punishment.
During the 1960s and 1970s, several attempts were made to shift the focus of
juvenile justice away from its emphasis on punitive remedies. *11
In Massachusetts, for example, all of the large juvenile correctional facilities
were shut down during the 1970s and replaced by smaller, community-based
programs. *12
Although less ambitious, similar efforts have been undertaken in Utah,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Florida. *13
Despite evidence that these reforms were both more cost-efficient and
effective, many of these initiatives were abandoned as the rate of violent
juvenile crime began to soar in the 1980s. In response to charges by legislators
and segments of the public that violent and delinquent youth were being coddled,
most states -- and California in particular-- have returned to earlier practices
in juvenile corrections, placing a renewed emphasis on punishment.
As a result of this change in policy, the number of incarcerated youth has
increased dramatically. In California, the number of juveniles incarcerated by
the state increased from 5,700 in June 1985 to 9,400 in 1994. *14
Sentences for juveniles convicted of violent crimes have also been lengthened. *15
Increases in the juvenile inmate population have been reported in other states
as well, though none have matched the pace of California, where the increase in
incarceration has outpaced the ability of the state to finance and construct new
facilities. Consequently, many youth correction centers are overcrowded, poorly
maintained, and generally regarded as unsafe.*16
California and other states have responded by planning for the construction
of more facilities and by modernizing some of the older ones. Despite the cost
of this strategy, and the disastrous effect that diverting financial resources
toward prison construction and maintenance has had on other state-sponsored
programs, there is no sign that policymakers are seriously considering
alternatives to incarceration at this time. *17
Enough time has passed since the mid-1980s to evaluate the results of this shift
toward a more stringent approach in the treatment of violent juvenile offenders,
and already several reasons for reconsideration of the direction of current
policy have emerged. First, there is no evidence that the significant increase
in the number of youth arrested and incarcerated for violent crimes has had any
effect on the regularity with which acts of violence are committed. Though some
argue that without this increase, even more violent crimes would have been
committed, *18
the fact that incidents of youth violence, including the most serious forms
(i.e. homicide, rape, armed robbery and kidnapping), have not decreased, and
that most projections indicate that further increases are likely in the future, *19
suggests that the current approach may not be working. Most experts agree that
the number of hard-core violent youth is relatively small, approximately 6%
according to most estimates, *20
however, identifying these individuals before they commit crimes is nearly
impossible. And incarcerating violent juveniles for longer periods or treating
them as adults does little to deter violence since there is no evidence that
perpetrators logically think through the consequences of their actions prior to
carrying them out. Furthermore, the sheer cost of implementing this strategy
weakens and limits the ability of the state to pursue other options, that might
be more effective in preventing youth violence.
The effectiveness of incarceration as a strategy for reducing violent crime is
limited in other ways as well. There is evidence that for many youth, the
experience of serving time in a large detention center may actually increase the
likelihood that they will commit violent crimes again in the future. *21
Little emphasis is placed on rehabilitation while youth are in custody, or on
re-entry programs when they return to their communities. According to the
California Youth Authority's (CYA) conservative measures, 55 - 60% of juvenile
convicts return to prison within two years after their release. *22
Moreover, even though the juvenile-corrections systems in California remains
officially committed to the goal of rehabilitation, producing a change in the
behavior of a significant number of inmates is unlikely because most of the
detention centers are tough, violent places. Since 1981, the number of cases of
battery without a weapon committed against incarcerated youth in facilities
managed by the CYA has increased steadily. *23
Juvenile convicts, the vast majority of whom are incarcerated for nonviolent
offenses, *24
are compelled to contend with this pervasive violence much of which is due to
widespread gang activity. The fact that prison officials are unable to control
violence within these facilities is a further indictment of this strategy.
Finally, despite the substantial public investment required to finance the
current strategy, there is no evidence that public fears about violent juvenile
crime have subsided. Opinion polls suggest that the public continues to be very
concerned about the problem of violent juvenile crime. For example, a national
poll commissioned by the American Federation of Teachers to ascertain the
public's expectations regarding public schools found that fears about violence
and the lack of safety surpassed concerns about educational issues. *25
These trends are mirrored in California, where fears of violent crime
remains high despite unprecedented levels of spending on law enforcement, the
enactment of the so-called three-strikes initiative, and plans to construct a
number of new prisons.
Although it might be argued that fear of crime may be greater than the problem
itself, an exaggerated perception of the problem is likely to result in even
more support for punitive measures for dealing with violent crime. Thus far, few
politicians have been willing to challenge this perception with accurate
information, even though the reality is that young people in general, and
minority youth in particular, are at greatest risk of becoming the victims of
youth violence. *26
In addition, although incidents of violent juvenile crime tend to occur most
often in low-income urban areas, in many ways the initiatives undertaken to
deter violent crime and ensure public safety have catered to the needs and fears
of middle-class voters who reside in communities that are relatively safe, while
the needs of the most vulnerable populations have received less attention. *27
Among academicians and researchers, the study of youth violence has been
dominated by criminologists who have focused their efforts on trying to explain
the causes of violent juvenile crime and devise strategies for reducing its
occurrence. Psychologists and more recently, epidemiologists and other
researchers in public health, have also taken on the study of youth violence.
All three disciplinary approaches have yielded important insights on aspects of
youth violence, but none has found what can definitively be regarded as the
cause(s) of this phenomenon; nor have they provided an adequate explanation for
its seemingly random nature. As is true for most problem-oriented research in
the behavioral sciences, the search for cause has generally been viewed as
critical to the development of solutions and remedies. Past experience has shown
that failure to accurately locate the cause of a social problem often leads to
treatment of its symptoms and, consequently, an inability to find lasting
solutions.
Among criminologists, research on youth violence has been dominated by ongoing
debates over the effectiveness of strategies employed by the justice system to
respond to the problem. As might be expected, there is continued controversy
over whether increasing the rate of incarceration actually lowers the rate of
violent juvenile crime. *28
The role and effectiveness of prisons as deterrents to violent crime, and their
potential for serving as sites of rehabilitation and retraining, also features
prominently in the research.*29
Much of this work has generated important information relevant to the study
of youth violence; however, little of this research has actually contributed to
the development of long-term solutions to the problem.
In recent years, research related to the development of interventions and
possible solutions has come from psychology and social welfare. In these fields,
the effort to identify the cause of youth violence has focused on a set of
variables conceived of as "risk factors" that are associated with
violent behavior. These factors include the influence of social and cultural
forces emanating from the neighborhood/community, school, peers, and family, as
well as characteristics that are particular to the individual-- namely,
intelligence, personality traits, and physical and mental health.*30
This line of inquiry has also focused attention on correlations between violent
behavior and biological factors, such as hormonal imbalances, head injuries and
possible genetic linkages to aggression. *31
In addition to the risk factors, protective factors have also been identified to
try to explain why two individuals who are similar in most ways might exhibit
different behavior. In short, the approach taken in psychology is to attempt to
explain violent behavior through an understanding of the way in which it is
produced through the interaction of individuals and the social environment. *32
Following a strategy that has proven effective with the study of communicable
diseases, public health researchers-- in particular epidemiologists-- have also
taken on the search for the cause(s) of youth violence. Resources have been
directed at studying patterns of violence and victimization among populations
exhibiting the greatest risk of vulnerability. *33
Drawing on a conceptual framework that has been used by public health
researchers in the study of disease, these scholars have attempted to identify
and analyze the interaction between host, agent, and environment in the study of
youth violence. Through review and analysis of demographic data, epidemiologists
have been able to identify not only what types of people are most at risk, but
also the locations and even the time at which violence is most likely to occur.*34
Such an analysis has proven to be extremely helpful for targeting
interventions at specific populations and groups. Moreover, by treating youth
violence as a public health issue, these researchers are helping to broaden the
search for solutions away from an exclusive focus on law enforcement, towards
the identification of alternative strategies.
As a result of these research efforts, we now know much more about juvenile
violence. We know what kinds of individuals and groups are most likely to be
victims and perpetrators; we know that familial dysfunction, child abuse,
community disorder, racial discrimination, poverty, and the availability of guns
greatly contribute to the persistence of this problem; and we know that
increasing the incarceration rate for violent juvenile offenders has not yet
reduced the incidence of youth violence. Nevertheless, although numerous studies
have been commissioned in the public and private sectors, and several scholarly
associations have directed research and resources at efforts to promote violence
prevention, these endeavors have not yet yielded effective solutions. For all we
know about the nature of youth violence, we still understand very little about
its causes. Consequently, while policymakers continue with their efforts to
build more prisons and incarcerate more young people, researchers continue
searching for answers, unable to reach consensus on a strategy for effective
prevention of the problem.
How do we explain the inability of researchers in the social sciences and
medicine to find solutions to the problem of youth violence? Undoubtedly, much
of the frustration is due to a misunderstanding of the problem itself. The
assumption underlying much of the research on youth violence is that a singular
cause or set of discrete causal variables can be identified, isolated, and acted
upon. Though such a model has been applied successfully in other research
endeavors, it may be that certain aspects of the human condition cannot be
explained through traditional forms of scientific inquiry, and youth violence
may be such a phenomenon
Violence among young people must be understood as more than just an expression
of aggressive individual behavior. It must be seen as part of a larger cultural
phenomenon, one that is inextricably woven into the history and social fabric of
our society. Though we may be repulsed by certain forms of violence, we must
acknowledge that our society glorifies and is entertained by violence.
We may react strongly to child abuse or crimes against the elderly, but in our
culture we honor and heap admiration upon individuals in sports or the military
whose capacity for violence enables them to overcome their opponents or trounce
their enemies. Violence and violent images are pervasive, infiltrating our
language through metaphors and helping to define our collective sense of who we
are as a people and as citizens of the most powerful nation on earth.
Violence is also a learned behavior. It may be consciously and unconsciously
reinforced by families through child-rearing practices or promoted by the media
and other expressions of popular culture through subtle and blatant images. Even
our collective response to the threat of violence often manifests itself through
some other form of violence: we sanction the killing of killers, and accept the
notion that personal safety can be achieved by allowing citizens to be armed. At
a visceral level, many of us seek justice for violence through some other form
of violence.
Certain forms of violence (i.e. drive-by shootings) are more likely to be
exhibited in specific contexts or by certain groups of people. However, even in
our highly stratified and segregated communities, increasingly violence knows no
limits or bounds. There is substantial evidence that violence is pervasive and
not constrained by race, class, gender, or geographic location. To be sure, ours
is not the only society that experiences high levels of violence, but what is
uniquely American is the high rate of interpersonal violence, particularly
involving young people. *35
If we accept the view of violence as a cultural phenomenon, one that is embedded
in our collective history, reinforced by the media, and practiced or glorified
in almost every sector of our society, then we must accept the reality that we
cannot respond to it by isolating or incapacitating some number of violent
individuals or targeting particular groups. Yet most of the focus of
policymakers, the criminal justice system, and current research has concentrated
on the violent behavior of a particular group -- young Black and Latino males --
and on manifestations of violence in low-income urban areas.*36
Popular images of violence in our society have become intimately associated with
young, urban, Black and Latino males. This is due both to the rate at which
incidents of violence occur in these areas and among this segment of the
population, and also because of perceptions and stereotypes that are rooted in
our history of racism and discrimination. It is sensible to concentrate research
on, and develop interventions for, those segments of the population that have
been most likely to exhibit or become victims of violence; however, by
overlooking the broader cultural manifestations of violence, we not only add to
the marginalization and stigmatization of the targeted group, but also ignore
the host of factors that contribute to the persistence of this problem
throughout our society.
Responding to violence as a cultural phenomenon has important implications for
the interventions and long-term solutions that are devised to address its
expression among youth. This focus compels us to examine the ways in which
violence is promoted in our society and how it may be normalized as a part of
social interaction among certain subcultures.*37
It also helps us to analyze how violent behavior may be produced in particular
contexts through the interaction of individuals and groups and the social
environment.
As an example of the way this approach could be applied in research, I will
describe a project that I developed at four local middle schools in the San
Francisco Bay Area for studying youth attitudes toward violence. I undertook
this project because despite my own experience of growing up in Brooklyn, New
York where I was exposed to a considerable amount of violence, I felt that I did
not know enough about how young people today perceive and interpret the meaning
of violence in their environment.
To gain a better understanding, I conducted research with young people at four
middle schools, two of which primarily served middle-class suburban students and
two of which served low-income urban students. All of the schools were racially
integrated, though there were no white students present in the classes at the
urban schools where the research was conducted. Part of the research involved
the development of an anonymous questionnaire (see
below), which I administered to students and then followed with group
discussions. The questions focused on how students experience violence in their
everyday lives and how they might respond when presented with situations that
involved violence.
In my analysis of students' responses to the questions, one important finding
stood out: for nearly all of the students in the low-income urban school, even
those who had never been in a fight before, violence was seen as an unavoidable
part of their social reality. That is, when confronted with situations in which
violence was a strong possibility, these students were less likely to consider
calling upon an adult for protection or help in resolving the dispute. Instead,
they were more likely to consider calling on friends or family for backup, with
some indicating that they would even consider arming themselves for protection.
When I asked these students why they felt fighting was unavoidable, I was told
repeatedly that an adult can provide only temporary protection. These students
felt that, eventually, they must confront a challenger and that reporting the
individual to school authorities might only worsen the consequences.
In contrast, nearly all of the middle-class students at both suburban schools
felt that they could rely upon an adult to intervene and prevent a violent
confrontation. They expressed concern about bullies and gangs who at times
preyed upon other students, but most felt that violence was avoidable, and like
the kids at the urban schools, these students described being entertained by
fights among their peers. In sum, the vast majority of these students lived in
an environment where personal security and safety were to a large extent
assured, while the urban students felt vulnerable and endangered, and viewed the
threat of violence as an unavoidable feature of their social environment with
which they had to contend.
What these students' experiences with violence tell us is that at least part of
the effort to reduce the incidence of youth violence must include an attempt to
challenge and counter the ways in which violence is normalized and becomes seen
as a legitimate, and even appropriate, way to respond to certain situations.
Such a challenge must address violent behavior in context; conflict resolution
and anger-control techniques are generally not effective in situations where
others are operating by a different set of rules and expectations. Just as rates
of violence vary across populations and communities, the norms and values that
frame its occurrence vary as well. Hence, the approaches devised to address this
problem must:
Answer the following questions either true or false.
1. In the last year, someone that I know was a victim of violence, and was
either hurt or killed.
2. I sometimes carry a weapon for protection.
3. I have been in a fight in the last month.
4. I have been in a fight in the last two months.
5. I hardly ever fight if I can avoid it.
6. Using violence to get what you want is never the right thing to do.
7. I enjoy watching violent movies.
8. I often worry about being hurt by someone when I am at school.
9. I often worry about being hurt by someone when I am at home or in my
neighborhood.
10. I respect and look up to people who know how to fight well.
Answer the following questions by placing a check next to the sentence that
best describes what you think or feel, or by writing in your own response.
If you know that someone wants to fight with you, the best thing to do
is:
___a. Tell an adult.
___b. Tell your friends or family so that you have some back-up.
___c. Carry a weapon with you just in case you get jumped.
___d. Try to talk to the person to resolve the conflict peacefully.
If you knew that another student brought a weapon to school you would:
___a. Tell a teacher or the principal.
___b. Mind your own business and not tell anyone.
___c. Talk to the person to find out what was going on.
___d. Talk to your friends about it.
If you know that two people are going to fight after school the best thing to
do is:
___a. Watch the fight.
___b. Help the person that is loosing.
___c. Tell an adult.
___d. Go home and mind your own business.
Which if any of the following would you consider a legitimate reason for
fighting:
_____a. Someone looks at you the wrong way or says something bad about you.
_____b. Someone threatens you, a family member or friend.
_____c. Someone hits you, a family member or friend.
_____d. Someone says something bad about your mother.
_____e. Other
Do you enjoy watching violent movies? Why or why not?
Are there any occasions when you feel violence may be appropriate or necessary?
In the final pages, I will present an analysis of three case studies that
demonstrate how strategies, that take culture into account have been
successfully applied. Each case presents a concrete example of how a normative
frame of reference that supported violent behavior was challenged. The
strategies described grew out of trial and error and emerged in response to
particular problems and conditions.
Case Study I:
During the 1992-93 academic year, Lowell Middle School was distinguished from
other middle schools in Oakland because it was the only school at which no
weapons had been confiscated from students. *38
Particularly noteworthy was the fact that Lowell is located in West Oakland,
an economically blighted community with a reputation for drug dealing, poverty,
and high rates of crime and violence.
This reputation requires even further clarification in order to truly understand
what has been accomplished at Lowell. There is no viable local economy for the
residents of West Oakland as there are no banks, hardware stores or pharmacies.
There is one relatively large grocery store, but according to published reports,
it charges 22% more on average for common household goods than other
supermarkets in Oakland.*39
Liquor stores, in contrast, are plentiful, and the landscape is filled with
culturally oriented billboards, most of which advertise liquor and cigarettes.
This community has been a magnet for TOADS (Temporarily Obsolete or Abandoned
Derelict Sites) and LULUs (Locally Unwanted Land Uses). According to recent
environmental impact reports, there are 630 sites of potential soil
contamination due to leaking tanks or mismanaged toxic materials. The area is
also characterized by illegal dumping, which occurs not only on vacant lots but
on street corners and school grounds as well. *40
The combination of traffic emissions from the surrounding freeways and air
pollution from local industry -- such as the sewage treatment plant managed by
the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD)-- has created poor air quality
which many residents believe to be responsible for the higher-than-average
asthma rates and respiratory problems among children.*41
In between residential areas, and on some streets right next door to family
homes, there is a smattering of heavy industry and warehouses (the kinds of
businesses that once provided union jobs at decent wages), but for the most
part, West Oakland residents are not employed at these companies. *42
As might be expected, this is a community in which the rate of youth violence is
very high. West Oakland youth account for a disproportionate share of the
homicides, rapes, and aggravated assaults committed by youth in Oakland each
year. *43
At Lowell, 69% of the students are from families whose income makes them
eligible for federally subsidized free breakfast and lunch programs: school
district records indicate that 64% of the children are from families that
receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).*44
In the 1992 academic year, approximately two-thirds of all Lowell students lived
with someone other than their biological parents,*45
which for most students meant living with another family member-- usually a
grandmother-- or in a foster home.
As is true in many urban schools, most Lowell teachers commute to work and are
not familiar with West Oakland. In fact, for many, the surrounding neighborhood
embodies all of the negative images associated with inner-city life. The
perceived threat of crime and violence emanating from the community invariably
influences the way that many teachers see the children. Fear and suspicion have
thus added to the difficulties created by differences in race, class, and age to
reinforce profound psychological barriers to cooperation and constructive
communication between teachers and parents, school and community.
Not surprisingly, past efforts to promote safety at Lowell relied on the
traditional kinds of responses to discipline problems and the threat of violence
in the schools that have been popular elsewhere.*46
For example, in response to complaints over the lack of safety at the school
filed by four teachers in 1992, the school adopted an experimental approach to
the problem of disruptive students, which in the eyes of many teachers was
intimately related to the problem of school violence. Teachers compiled a list
of the most difficult students at the school and with district funds, assigned a
new teacher the task of working with 18 of the most incorrigible of them in an
isolated classroom. The plan was characterized as being in the best interests of
the targeted students, in that it was intended to "provide a culturally
relevant curriculum and enhanced academic and social support to at-risk
students." *47
Before long it became clear that for the teacher and the 18 students, the class
was not working. Students complained bitterly about being isolated and deprived
of participating in school activities. Even the young teacher, who had
previously seemed optimistic, threatened to quit because the class proved
impossible to manage. Interestingly, when other teachers were interviewed about
how their classes were going without the more troublesome students, several told
me that students, who had previously not been regarded as problems, had emerged
to fill the role of class troublemaker. One teacher even suggested that another
classroom for disruptive students should be created.
Eventually, this experiment was abandoned and in its place concrete steps were
taken by the staff to create a school environment that provides students with a
sense of security and stability. Recognizing that many students come to school
hungry, the school offered children in need three free meals a day. Coats and
shoes were also made available to children through donations collected by the
school staff. For the past two years school hours have been extended for
tutoring, photography, and recreational activities. In the evenings and on
weekends, the site is used by community organizations that provide services to
children and the community, such as the Omega Boys Club, West Oakland Mental
Health, and the Parks and Recreation Department of the City of Oakland.
The gap between the school and community has also been bridged by Betty Maze,
the school's campus monitor, who is a grandmother living in the community.
Unlike the physically intimidating men who are hired to patrol most urban school
grounds, Ms. Maze provides discipline through compassion rather than coercion
and is able to promote school safety because she is familiar with the life
experience of the students. Without using force, Ms. Maze is able to break up
fights, handle students who are too difficult and disruptive for most teachers,
and keep strangers off the campus. Because the students respect her-- and not
because they are physically intimidated by her-- they listen to and comply with
her instructions.
Frustrated by the failure of traditional methods, Lowell teachers began thinking
more creatively about ways to respond to discipline problems. They recognized
the futility of relying on suspension from school to punish students who don't
attend school regularly anyway, and devised alternative forms of discipline
which occur at the school. Through group discussion teachers have challenged
practices such as the use of public humiliation as a form of discipline. To
encourage students to reflect upon their actions and take responsibility for
their behavior, they have explored ways of teaching ethical and moral issues
within their classroom. And as individuals, the teachers have been critically
examining their own behavior in an effort to become more aware of the ways in
which their style of teaching and disciplining students might be changed to
enable them to better meet students' needs.
Gradually, these initiatives have helped to transform the school culture at
Lowell and have helped to make the school a source of stability and security for
the children. Although it is difficult to quantify the effects these changes
have had on the school site, for students and teachers, the difference is real
and appreciable. For the students in particular, even those who behave
differently on the streets, Lowell has become a place that is no longer seen as
appropriate for or conducive to violent behavior.
Case Study II:
Beginning in the summer of 1989 and continuing through the winter of 1991,
several violent disturbances and incidents involving teenagers occurred on
Telegraph Avenue in Berkeley. *48
Given the area's history as a focal point for numerous protests and violent
conflicts, news of rioting on Telegraph did not initially seem out of the
ordinary to most observers. However, what made these disturbances unique was
that they involved large numbers of Black teenagers from communities across the
Bay Area who congregated on the avenue on weekend nights. Though the vast
majority were there for nothing more than a slice of pizza and harmless fun,
there were also groups and individuals who descended upon Telegraph Avenue with
the intention of committing crimes and victimizing college students.
After several weekends of violence, which included a substantial rise in
robberies, aggravated assaults, rapes, and looting,*49
the city of Berkeley began deploying large numbers of police officers to the
area on Friday and Saturday evenings, with the hope that such a presence would
frighten away criminal elements. With 50 to 60 officers present in the
five-block area, the number of violent incidents declined substantially within a
relatively short period of time. However, the massive police presence also had
the effect of scaring away many of the tourists and customers who frequented
restaurants and stores in the area. Business owners complained that while they
wanted relief from the crowds of teenagers, the city's strategy had hurt their
revenues. City officials themselves began to question their strategy for
addressing the problem. Though dispatching large numbers of police officers to
the area had reduced the number of violent incidents involving young people, the
cost of sustaining this operation was beyond what the city could afford.
Increasingly, pressure mounted for a more limited operation aimed specifically
at driving crowds of Black youth from the area. Several business owners called
for the creation of a curfew, and some advocated the enlistment of the FBI to
respond to what they claimed was a growing number of racially motivated violent
crimes. Students and University officials also expressed concern about the lack
of safety in the area, but were generally less willing to endorse measures that
might appear to undermine civil liberties. In keeping with Berkeley's radical
image, still another segment of the community decried the police action as
fascistic and vowed to oppose any strategy in which law enforcement targeted
kids.
Faced with few viable options for resolving the problem and a deeply divided
community, city officials returned to a strategy that had proven effective in
the past: they created a large community task force to develop recommendations
for solving the problem. The task force was composed of representatives from
each of the relevant constituencies in the community including youth from
Berkeley. For three months, the task force and various subcommittees met in an
effort to build consensus on a set of recommendations. As could have been
expected, differences emerged, discussions often deteriorated into arguments,
and the group process gradually proved too exhausting for some. Eventually, a
breakthrough did occur. As a result of conversations with young people held by a
subcommittee, a recommendation emerged, calling for the creation of a youth
group that would serve as an escort service and monitoring patrol on the Avenue.
Unlike other proposals that had been debated, this one found broad agreement:
the idea that young people could play a role in mediating conflicts and
promoting safety through their presence in the area on weekend nights appealed
to most of the members and won the group's endorsement.
As a result, R.E.S.P.E.C.T. (Racial and Ethnic Sharing Providing Empowerment to
our Community Today) was created in the summer of 1993 through funding from the
Berkeley City Council. *50
Composed of young people from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds, the
organization was charged with helping to provide security on Telegraph Avenue in
a non-threatening, nonconfrontational manner. Explicit in the charge was the
admonition that R.E.S.P.E.C.T guides were not to engage in any form of police
work. Wearing dark jackets and hats and armed with radios, the guides were to
report all suspicious activities to the police, provide escort service to
individuals desiring company when walking home at night, and attempt to mediate
conflicts involving young people on Telegraph Avenue.
R.E.S.P.E.C.T was one part of a package of new measures adopted to address
problems of youth violence on Telegraph Avenue. This package also included
midnight basketball, a mentorship/apprenticeship program, and the city's
sponsorship of regular weekend parties held at venues throughout the community,
with security and supervision provided. It also included preventive measures
such as strict parking enforcement in the Telegraph area to reduce cruising and
a visible, though less extensive, police presence.
The combination worked. In the two years since R.E.S.P.E.C.T. and the other
measures were put in place, crimes by young people in the area have diminished
substantially. In fact, city officials have been so pleased by the impact of
R.E.S.P.E.C.T. on Telegraph Avenue that they have expanded the program to other
areas of the city, and have pledged to continue funding for the project for the
next five years. *51
The Berkeley Police Department has been one of the strongest supporters for the
program. Whereas the allocation of one police officer to the area cost the city
approximately $100,000.00 annually in salaries and benefits, the entire
R.E.S.P.E.C.T. program costs $110,000.00 annually. (In 1992 this included
salaries for two coordinators and seven guides.) Police support for the program
is based on the fact that R.E.S.P.E.C.T. guides allow the police to avoid
unnecessary confrontations with young people and panhandlers. According to
Berkeley Police Captain Roy Misner:
As a strategy for violence prevention the R.E.S.P.E.C.T. program was
successful because it did not rely upon intimidation and coercion. Involving
young people in a solution --the development of the security program -- changed
the mood on the Avenue and greatly reduced the tensions that had been growing
between young people and adults in the area. The presence of the young
R.E.S.P.E.C.T. guides in their jackets and hats communicated to other young
people that they were not being targeted for harassment because they were young
and Black. R.E.S.P.E.C.T. allowed young people to take responsibility for
creating a safer environment on the Avenue, a goal that most youth could
understand and accept.
Case Study III:
Prepackaged freebase or crack cocaine, known as "rock" on the West
Coast, began to appear on the streets of Berkeley in the early 1980s.*53
Concentrated in the predominantly Black neighborhoods of South and West
Berkeley, the advent of crack cocaine brought with it a substantial increase in
violent crime and social upheaval. Young people featured prominently in drug
trafficking activities, serving both as street-level dealers and security for
the protection of turf. Minors were particularly well suited for this trade
because if apprehended by the police, they could avoid the stiffer penalties
reserved for adults. The absence of more established gangs in Berkeley also
created conditions that were favorable to aspiring young drug dealers. With
considerable profits available for those willing to take the risk, many young
people in Berkeley became involved with the drug trade, and consequently there
was soon a significant increase in the number of youth arrested for drug related
and violent crimes during the period from 1984 to 1988.
The city's ability to respond to this situation was complicated by a split
between city residents regarding perceptions of the drug problem, dividing them
along socioeconomic and racial lines. While most residents in Berkeley's
African-American community demanded tough action on the part of the city, many
progressive, white residents residing in safer middleclass neighborhoods
expressed more concern about the protection of civil liberties. The latter
opposed any policy that seemed to emphasize law enforcement and questioned the
efficacy of a strategy focused primarily on arresting street-level dealers, who
comprised only the lower echelons of the illicit drug trade. Both sides were
vocal and active, and both groups asserted considerable political pressure on
city government.
Initially, the City's attempts to counter drug trafficking relied on
intensifying law enforcement efforts in the affected neighborhoods. However,
though the number of drug-related arrests soared as a result of increased police
pressure, the problem persisted. Each time a crack house was shut down or a
dealer was arrested, another venue and dealer emerged to fill the market niche.
Pressure from South and West Berkeley who were residents feeling besieged by the
rising crime rate, continued to grow, eventually prompting the city to develop
and implement a new drug policy that included short -- and long-term strategies
for addressing drug-related problems.*54
Intended to be comprehensive in nature, the new strategy combined
neighborhood-based policing with new opportunities for treatment for drug users
and their families and the creation of various opportunity programs for youth.
The Real Alternatives Project (RAP) was created in 1988 and intended to serve as
the model opportunity program for troubled youth.
Created by a coalition of community-based agencies providing different types of
youth services in Berkeley, RAP was designed to provide individualized and
integrated prevention and intervention services to disadvantaged, at-risk youth,
the kind of youngsters who were being lured into the drug trade. The 38 young
people selected for the program were between the ages of 14 and 16 and had
previously been identified as "at-risk" by school counselors and/or
the police department. The basis for this selection included prior contact with
the police for a criminal offense, poor school performance, low income, and a
family history of criminal or delinquent behavior. The program goal was to
provide these teenagers with a comprehensive array of services so that negative
behavioral outcomes could be prevented and reduced. Additionally, the designers
of RAP believed that if these "at-risk" youth could be integrated into
a peer group that modeled positive behaviors and norms, they would be more
likely to distance themselves from the environmental and peer influences that
had contributed to their past troubles.
*55
A central feature of RAP involved the provision of culturally relevant services,
including tutoring, part-time and summer employment, counseling, recreational
activities, mentoring, and family workshops. In addition, youth in RAP were each
assigned a case counselor who served as their confidant, broker, and advocate,
and who closely monitored their behavior at home, school, and in the
neighborhood. The operating assumption of the program was that case counselors
who shared the cultural background of the youth, and who were not too much
older, could most effectively assist them in avoiding trouble and improving
their behavior.
After seven years of operation, there is clear evidence that RAP has been
successful as a deterrent to violence and criminal behavior. For the young
people enrolled, the number of contacts with police for criminal or violent
behavior has been greatly reduced. Graduation and school-retention rates
increased dramatically, and suspension and expulsion rates declined
substantially. The cost of the program (approximately $3,500.00 per student),
its comprehensive character, and its proven effectiveness, have enabled it to
grow from 38 students in 1988 to 120 in 1995. With base funding from the City of
Berkeley secured through the year 2000, the program has been able to attract
additional funds from the Federal government Office of Substance Abuse
Prevention, to support its expansion.
RAP is now widely seen as a valuable community resource in that it has provided
a viable alternative for serving the needs of delinquent youth, before they get
into deeper trouble. For the youth in the program, RAP counselors have supplied
crucial emotional and psychological support, providing the stability lacking in
their families and environment. Furthermore, as the program's links with the
community have strengthened, participation in RAP has evolved from stigma to
status: whereas participants in the program previously viewed RAP as yet another
means to punish kids, the participants and their peers now report that
membership in RAP is a privilege. According to one participant:
Very Very
Low Low OK High High
Self Esteem (28)-- (34)5 (36)18 (2)42 (--)35
Effort/Attitude (44)6 (42)12 (14)38 (--)35 (--) 9
Toward School
Drug and (moderate use)
Alcohol Use (26)58 (44)38 (23)4 (7)-- (--)--
School (42)-- (25)4 (21)26 (12)48 (--)22
Attendance
Police Contacts (22)40 (34)46 (18)14 (20)-- (6)--
*All numbers represent percentages (N=38). Figures in parentheses are based
on data collected at the beginning of the program in 1998. The adjacent number
represents finding from 1992 evaluation study. *57
Finding ways to challenge the cultural norms that support violent behavior
must become the central issue of violence-prevention initiatives. The cultural
forces that legitimatize and condone violent behavior must be challenged in
context, and we must find ways to replace those norms with others that affirm
respect for life and nonviolence. This might include an approach taken to
counter the violent images promoted through some rap music by supporting those
rap artists who produce music with nonviolent messages rather than attacking the
artists, the recording companies, or the young people who listen to gangsta rap.
If we want to see fewer juvenile delinquents graduate to more serious forms of
crime we must invest more resources into re-entry programs that facilitate the
transition from prison to the streets, so that young people seeking to avoid
peer groups and neighborhood influences that reinforce violent behavior can do
so with support.
Finally, if we acknowledge that youth violence is really a symptom of a larger
societal preoccupation with violence, then we must stop allowing kids,
particularly minority youth, to be scapegoated for this problem. Young people
living in our nation's ghettos have no control over the availability of guns or
the flow of drugs into their communities. They cannot influence filmmakers and
producers who exploit our national obsession with violence through their movies
and television programs.
And young people certainly have no control over the availability of jobs and
educational opportunities or the continued deterioration of urban areas. We must
hold young people responsible for their actions and apply clear consequences for
misdeeds and violent behavior, but we must also recognize that these youth did
not create the conditions in which violence flourishes. We can do a much better
job of preventing youth violence, but to do so we must begin by acknowledging
our collective responsibility for challenging the cultural influences and social
and economic conditions that foster and promote it.
Given the failure of current policies aimed at reducing and preventing youth
violence, policymakers must encourage and support local governments and schools
in devising alternative strategies that address the cultural conditions which
normalize violent behavior. While there may be no blueprint or singular approach
that can be adopted or applied uniformly, community-based initiatives should
consider the following points when developing a new program.
Community Involvement
Whenever possible, involve community residents, especially young people, in the
development and implementation of an intervention program. Solicit their input
and provide them the resources needed to participate fully. Use the planning
process to learn more about how community residents and young people perceive
the problem and its causes.
Creativity
Use the planning process for open discussion and brainstorming of solutions.
Though all ideas must ultimately be judged on the basis of their feasibility,
avoid premature closure of debate or dismissal of ideas because they seem
unconventional. Due to its complex nature, effective strategies for countering
youth violence will undoubtedly require a considerable amount of time to
materialize, and a willingness to experiment with novel approaches.
Collaboration
Avoid turf battles and the politicization of the program by including relevant
agencies and organizations on an oversight committee that remains intact after
the intervention program has been implemented. Keep youth and community
residents involved, but also include representatives from local businesses, law
enforcement and the courts, local churches, community groups and non-profit
service agencies. Develop shared ownership and responsibility for the success of
the intervention.
Evaluation
Document the impact of the intervention through the collection of data related
to manifestations of the problem. This may include crime reports and school
disciplinary records, but can also survey data on perceptions of the problem.
Use the oversight committee as a source of continuous information to identify
problems that may develop and to monitor how the program is working.