07-02-04

A deadly explosion at an Algerian LNG complex earlier suddenly thrust safety to the top of public concerns about the growing number of LNG projects proposed for North America. Energy companies have long insisted the fuel is risk-free. They cite a four-decades-long history without a major accident. But the Jan. 20 explosion at Algeria's 230-acre Skikda LNG centre, which killed 30 people and injured more than 70, altered that perception.
"The Algerian accident destroyed the industry's 40-year safety record," said Casi Callaway, executive director of Mobile Bay Watch, an Alabama environmental group challenging two proposed LNG terminals on the bay.

LNG might not even have caused the Algeria blast. According to news reports, officials at Sonatrach, the country's state-owned gas and oil company, put the blame on a faulty steam boiler next to a liquefaction unit. Energy analysts say plant personnel were trying to restart the boiler when the blast occurred. It caused a fire that destroyed three of the complex's six liquefaction units and badly damaged a nearby berth for loading LNG tankers.
The incident has fuelled a global debate over potential hazards associated with LNG, which can explode, catch fire or send up a vapour cloud that can float over a large area and then ignite. Attention to the fuel already had heated up in the wake of 9/11.

Last November, the Department of Homeland Security warned that LNG facilities might be targets of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks because LNG terminals and tankers are highly visible and easily identified.
"For nearly 50 years now, all discussions of risk and probability... have focused on how to account for human errors," said Jerry A. Havens, director of the Chemical Hazards Research Centre at the University of Arkansas. "The new reality is that we must now consider malicious acts as well."

Only four receiving terminals currently operate in the United States. But companies have proposed as many as 30 additional projects for Canada, the United States and Mexico, including one at Long Beach and at least three in Baja California that would ship natural gas to Southern California.
The infrastructure of LNG consists of interconnected transportation and storage facilities, each with distinct operational risks and security concerns. Hazards are usually related to three elements in the supply chain -- tanker ships, marine terminals (both for liquefying and regasifying the fuel) and storage facilities.

After the Algerian accident, which occurred at a liquefaction facility as opposed to the re-gasification terminals eyed for North America, US regulatory agencies stepped up their efforts to re-examine LNG safety issues. The Department of Energy announced it is greatly expanding a new LNG safety study "to err on the side of inclusion rather than speed." And the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission, which along with the Coast Guard and Office of Pipeline Safety issues permits for LNG projects, is following the Algerian investigation to learn lessons it can apply in the United States.
"The commission puts safety first," FERC official J. Mark Robinson declared at an LNG conference at the Institute of the Americas on the UCSD campus.

Although energy companies insist current safety rules are adequate, they are encountering stiffer resistance to their projects. Safety concerns now dog the steps of almost every proposal, including those in Mexico.
"They'll face additional challenges in terms of selling these projects," said Jeremy Martin, director of the institute's energy program. Opposition groups, meanwhile, are seeing their ranks expand.
"There could be no doubt it strengthened our position," said Tim McKay, executive director of Northcoast Environmental Centre, a coalition of non-profit groups contesting Calpine's proposal to build an LNG terminal on Northern California's Humboldt Bay.
Other groups report increased phone and e-mail inquiries. A poll of Mobile Bay area residents after the Algerian blast indicated opposition to the local projects had grown from 35 % the previous October to 62 % currently.

It was an accident -- the "Cleveland Disaster" of 1944 -- that first raised public concern about LNG risks and has limited the industry's growth ever since. According to the Bureau of Mines investigation of that tragedy, the East Ohio Gas compromised the design of a storage tank due to a shortage of stainless steel alloys during World War II. The tank failed, allowing a vapour cloud to escape into surrounding streets and the storm sewer system, where it ignited. The explosion and fire killed 128 people and injured 435 more.
There were less-serious accidents at Staten Island, NY, in 1973, and at Cove Point, Maryland, in 1979. The Staten Island incident, which killed 40 people, was a construction, not an LNG, accident.

The Cove Point incident, which killed one person, prompted major design code changes that now are used industry-wide. No deaths or serious incidents involving LNG have occurred in the United States since Cove Point. Serious risks remain, however, because LNG is volatile and is usually stored and shipped in large quantities.
The industry notes that LNG is explosive only within a narrow range of concentrations in the air, 5 % to 15 %). Within that range, however, the fuel is combustible, so an uncontrolled release of LNG could trigger an explosion or fire.

If liquefied gas spills but doesn't immediately ignite, the evaporating gas will form a vapour cloud that could drift away from the spill site. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, it can catch fire or, less likely, explode.
Mexico's environmental agency, Semarnat (Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) said an accident at the Sempra Energy-Shell LNG terminal proposed next to the Bajamar resort in Baja California could cause second-degree burns within 20 seconds for anyone within a mile of the project.

A greater risk, however, is posed by pool fires, which burn on water. Such a fire would spread as the LNG expanded away from the source of a spill and continued to evaporate. Pool fires are intense, burning far more hotly and rapidly than oil or gasoline fires. They must burn out because they can't be put out. There have been no reports of any large, accidental pool fires.
"Many experts agree that a pool fire... is the most serious LNG hazard," said a US Congressional Research Service report. "Because LNG pool fires are so hot, their thermal radiation may injure people and damage property a considerable distance from the fire itself."

Governments around the globe require "exclusion zones" that are supposed to isolate LNG facilities from people and property. But there is widespread disagreement over the size of these zones. How close is too close in siting LNG terminals?
Off-shore facilities, because of their distance from populated areas, pose less risk than those on shore. US government regulations focus on "credible" rather than "worst-case" scenarios. As a result, the hazard zones often don't extend beyond a plant's boundaries.

The rules also ignore the risks associated with tanker operations. Although LNG ships have enviable safety records, the attacks on the USS. Cole in 2000 and the French tanker Limburg in 2002 demonstrate that ships aren't exempt from terrorist attacks. Havens, one of the country's foremost experts on LNG safety, said regulators need to pay much more attention to the possibility of incidents involving tankers.
"Of all the potential hazards associated with shipping LNG, I believe that a massive spill from a ship, followed by a fire on the surface of the water, is the most likely worst-case scenario," he said.

Scientific consensus indicates an LNG-on-water spill fire involving a single tank would spread a half-mile in diameter. Ships typically carry up to five tanks. Havens said scientists also agree that from the edge of the fire to about another half-mile out, people would receive second-degree burns on unprotected skin within about 30 seconds.
Robinson, FERC's director of the Office of Energy Projects, said the agency has begun evaluating the potential consequences of tanker spills, as well as the other risks associated with LNG.
"No project will be permitted unless it meets our safety requirements," he said. Alberto de la Fuente, the Mexican Energy Regulatory Commission president's chief of staff, said Mexico is also alert to LNG's dangers.
"We are being as tough as we can with safety measures so that people are comfortable," he said.

In light of the Algerian accident and the dramatically increased amounts of LNG expected to be imported into North America in the next decade, the US Congress will play an major role in oversight of LNG safety.
"In particular," the research service report said, "Congress may consider whether future LNG security requirements will be adequately funded, whether these requirements will be appropriately balanced against evolving risks, and whether the LNG industry is carrying an appropriate share of the security burden."

Source: Union-Tribune