Mar 1 - Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News - Bryan Bender The Boston Globe

A senior official at Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Waterford, Conn., was recently relieved of his duties after he complained that the plant's electronic security system was seriously flawed and that site managers had turned it off on multiple occasions to avoid false alarms, according to a complaint to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Sham Mehta, 58, contends he was retaliated against after repeatedly lodging the allegations with his superiors at Dominion Nuclear Connecticut as well as a federal inspector at the plant. Mehta -- who was removed and is now on paid leave -- is seeking reinstatement while the NRC, state Department of Public Utility Control, and US Department of Labor investigate his allegations.

While Dominion refuses to talk about security matters, state investigators last month found there were "sufficient grounds" to believe Mehta was punished for raising the concerns about the plant's defenses.

The allegations about inadequate security at Millstone are occurring as the federal government is crafting new security standards for the nation's 64 nuclear power plants, and watchdog groups say the case highlights the need for more stringent oversight. The Millstone plant, which was temporarily shut down in 1997 by the NRC due to safety concerns, has passed all current tests to see whether attackers could penetrate the facility. But critics insist the tests are too easy to pass.

"They give them six months' warning that they're coming to test the defenses," said Peter Stockton, a senior investigator at the nonpartisan Project on Government Oversight and a former Energy Department security official.

"Perimeter fences are a key part" of plants' defenses, he said, referring to the type of electronic system allegedly turned off at Millstone. "They should be testing these systems much more aggressively."

Mehta, whose job was to field complaints from fellow plant workers, first notified Dominion officials in late 2004 that thousands of false alarms in the Intrusion Detection System were the result of rainy and windy weather coming off Long Island Sound or flocks of birds -- as many as 1,000 false alarms per day, according to the NRC report.

He also reported that the network of motion sensors and security cameras had been purposely turned off, posing what he described as "an unacceptable risk" of sabotage.

He said in the NRC complaint that he had personally noted that the system was off at one point and that workers had told him of other times when it had been turned off by security managers.

"I discussed my... concern with the security manager that potential intruders may take advantage of an unguarded area of the fence when the IDS is not functioning," he wrote in the December complaint.

The plant tried to compensate for the lack of adequate electronic surveillance by having guards drive around the exterior of the plant, Mehta said.

During an investigation he performed as part of his official duties, Mehta said in the complaint, he obtained signed statements from many security guards reporting that they were "desensitized" by the frequent false alarms and sometimes declined to investigate them.

Mehta, a mechanical engineer who has worked in the nuclear industry for 30 years, further alleged that security managers altered federal reports to contend that "extreme weather" was responsible for the false alarms even though they were triggered by average conditions.

State lawyers who reviewed the case concluded in ainternal memo that Mehta "did suffer an adverse employment action within a year of his reporting his safety concerns" and that "this establishes sufficient grounds to establish the rebuttable presumption that Mr. Mehta was retaliated against."

They recommended that Mehta's allegations be fully investigated and that he be reinstated.

Dominion is opposing efforts to reinstate Mehta, contending his position has been downsized. The plant's lawyer, David W. Bogan, argued in papers filed to the state that "Mr. Mehta failed to meet his burden to provide facts and supporting evidence" that he was punished for his safety concerns, while "Dominion provided clear and convincing evidence that its actions were taken for reasons unconnected" to Mehta's safety complaints.

But the company declined to discuss the specific allegations, citing security concerns.

"We have investigated every one of the allegations he has brought forward, and we simply disagree with his findings," said Peter A. Hyde, a Millstone spokesman. He later declined to say whether he was referring to the security concerns or Mehta's contention that he was wrongly relieved of his duties.

The NRC's regional office near Philadelphia said it, too, cannot discuss security-related matters, but spokesman Neil Sheehan said security complaints are usually forwarded to the Office of Investigations. If found to have merit, "We could take enforcement action against the company, or we could refer the matter to the Department of Justice for their review."

The NRC is currently drafting new rules for nuclear-plant security based on guidelines in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The act ordered that the NRC must take into account a dozen possible scenarios, including attacks by multiple teams; the potential that insiders might assist terrorists; and the possibility of water-based or airborne attacks.

But there are growing concerns that the rule-making process is not stringent enough. Watchdog groups say current proposals assume that an attack would be launched by fewer than half of the 19 hijackers responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

"Instead of looking at the actual threat, the NRC bases security standards on what the NRC, or perhaps the nuclear industry, believes a private guard force can be expected to handle," said Stockton.

The nuclear industry argues, however, that there are limits to private security forces and that plants must be able to draw on local and state police to supplement their forces in the event of an attack.

"What gets lost in the dialogue is that our facilities are protected by private forces," said David Walters, director of security for the Nuclear Energy Institute. He said the nation's 64 nuclear plants have increased the number of guards by 30 percent since 2001 and invested an additional $1.2 billion in security.

"When you talk about defending against enemies of the United States, you reach a limit of your capabilities," Walters said. "That doesn't mean we are not going to respond, but we may have to rely on local law enforcement, state resources, the federal government."

Still, many are expressing concerns that the NRC is shortchanging security standards.

Representative Edward J. Markey, a Malden Democrat who was instrumental in passing the 2005 legislation, said the federal government must take a stronger role in overseeing the security of nuclear plants.

"We cannot simply outsource the security of nuclear facilities to the nuclear utility industry and its subcontractors, with little or no federal oversight," he said in an e-mailed response to questions. "We have learned that without strict government guidelines, private companies do not always act with national security as their first priority."

At a minimum, local activists are calling for a new electronic security system at Millstone.

"The safety system is more than 35 years old," said Nancy Burton of the Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone, a citizens action group. "Millstone's owner has refused to spend the money required for its upkeep."