These days I make it my business to take for granted that just
about everyone understands the situation with oil. I assume that
with the oil price occasionally exceeding seventy dollars a
barrel, the more vulgar forms of optimism will be discarded.
Amazingly enough however, there are still persons with a passable
background in energy matters who are unable to deal with the new
oil realities. One of these harbingers of good news made herself
known to me recently, and at almost the same time the (official)
Swedish Energy Agency released its long awaited report on the
world oil situation.
Where this impressively educated young lady is concerned,
seismic technology is a “guess and a gamble”. Furthermore, she
assured me that even when drilling you can miss a mega-sized oil
field by a matter of “feet”. With all due respect, I interpret
this kind of information as one of two things: a complete lack of
knowledge about the most important commodity in the world, or
possibly contempt for mainstream science and technology, as well
as the men and women who have devoted their lives to it.
I was informed by the same person that the attempt to assess
oil reserves should be characterized as “guesswork” – which to a
certain extent it is; and so “the stuff written today about peak
oil is a bit like the usual nonsense about climate change. It is
written by people who know nothing about it.” I have reason to
believe that this is an indirect reference to the first chapter in
my forthcoming textbook (2007), which for good or evil I
circulated extensively.
The elite of oil geologists and petroleum engineers now accept
the peak oil thesis, while well over 90 percent of acknowledged
climatologists have attached a high probability to a large part of
present and future changes in climate having their origin in human
behaviour. Where the latter is concerned, right or wrong, I prefer
the opinions of experts to conjecture by the rank and file of
sceptics working the other side of the street, most of whom are
non-climatologists trying to make the most of a gut feeling. As
for the matter of peak (conventional) oil, I fail to understand
how we have peaks in e.g. huge land areas like North America or
the former Soviet Union, without recognizing that a global peak is
a distinct possibility, and perhaps in the near future.
Daniel Yergin of Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA)
created an interesting stir recently by the provocative remark
that there would not be an oil output peak, but an “undulating
plateau”. Although a peak does not imply an undulating plateau, an
undulating plateau implies a peak. Of course, it doesn’t really
make any difference, because if demand continues to expand the
effect on prices of an undulating plateau will be almost the same
as a distinct summit. There has also been some suggestion that the
present high oil price is the result of speculation by hedge funds
rather than a supply-and-demand phenomenon. The thing to remember
here is that there are more than 8000 hedge funds in this old
world of ours, and in 2004 more than 1000 of them went out of
business. Many of the remainder will probably be gone in a few
years, although unfortunately there is no shortage of replacements
nor blissfully unenlightened clients.
When I lecture on this topic I say that it’s possible to learn
everything that you need to know about what is going to happen
with global oil production by spending an hour or two examining
what happened in the United States. Modern oil history is
generally considered to have had its beginning in the U.S., and as
you can find out from the topic heading ‘Oil Fields’ in Google,
oil was produced in many states. The really big strike in the
lower ’48 was in East Texas, and for many years a large percentage
of the population of the U.S. did not believe that production in
that rich basin would ever peak.
But it did peak, and so did production in the lower ’48 about
the end of 1970. However a huge structure (Prudhoe Bay) had been
discovered in Alaska in l968, and when it came on-stream in l977
the (total) production curve in the U.S. rose for a while.
Unfortunately though (U.S.) output never reached the l970/71
level, and in 1986 the production curve turned down again. The
Prudhoe field peaked in l987/88, and for all practical purposes
that was the end of the widely circulated fantasy that the U.S.
could function without large and growing imports of foreign oil.
Today imports are much larger than domestic output, and with
production falling and demand increasing that situation cannot be
reversed. There are persons who claim that exploitation of the
North Slope of Alaska will reveal perhaps the largest oil bonanza
experienced in North America, but I have decided to believe that
if this were likely, there would already be a record amount of
drilling taking place there, regardless of the environmental and
political costs.
In addition I’ve decided to e.g. reject the hypothesis that the
UK North Sea peak is due to excessive taxation, as is occasionally
claimed. My argument here would be based on what is happening in
the Norwegian North Sea, which I know something about. I was also
told by the person mentioned above that 80% (or more) was the
correct figure for the recovery factor of oil. Unfortunately, even
if this were true, our oil worries might not be over, given that
only about 1 barrel of new oil is discovered for almost every 3
produced, although some people say that 1 for every 4 is closer to
the truth. I wouldn’t advise anyone to spend valuable time mulling
over this alleged recovery statistic though, because when I gave
my first lectures on oil in Australia, the actual recovery factor
was about 32%, while globally the present average is reckoned to
be about 35% by oil business insiders who would like nothing
better than to believe something quite different.
Both this young lady and the Swedish Energy Agency have great
faith in the tar sand reserves of Alberta. I don’t have any faith
in them at all where changing the international oil picture is
concerned, at least not for many years. Here the thing to focus on
is production rather than ‘reserves’. Tar sands and heavy oil can
drastically increase the nominal reserves figure, but this is a
distraction that, fortunately, at least some of our political
masters have been warned not to accept by important and
experienced oil company executives and their geologists. It might
also be wise to be careful where ethanol is concerned. As was
pointed out recently in EnergyPulse (energypulse@energypulse.net)
by Alan Jenkins and Jim Beyer, the economics of ethanol in e.g.
the U.S. does not make as much sense as many observers believe,
except possibly as a fuel additive.
If ex-post (actual) production and/or discovery ‘rates’
continue to fall, which is likely, while ex-ante (expected) demand
continues to rise, which is certain, oil prices could spike to
levels that are well above the danger level, which in turn raises
not only the prospect of macroeconomic and financial market chaos,
but the initiation or extension of small or large scale military
action. This is not a new idea, and I suspect that topics of this
nature are being treated at great length in the corridors and
restaurants of power in at least several of the main oil importing
countries by persons who are prepared to back their theories with
marines and gun ships.
Finally, a few words about the report of the Swedish Energy
Agency. As yet it is in Swedish, and as far as I know not
generally circulated (or even discussed), however on the basis of
a two minute presentation on Swedish television the day it was
finished, I know that it asserts that there is no need to be
concerned about oil in the foreseeable future. Such being the
case, it would hardly make a difference if that crank document
were available in every civilized language, and in addition was
passed out on every street corner between Lapland and the Cape
Town naval yard, because there isn’t a serious decision maker in
Sweden who finds this kind of news plausible, regardless of what
they might say when TV cameras are pointed in their direction.
The simple and inescapable fact of the matter is that the money
that the major oil producing countries have been making over the
last year or so, and which will continue to roll in during the
next few years (because of the actual shortage of oil in the
ground in relation to the demand for this commodity), has provided
them with some remarkable options when it comes to choosing
strategies for the great oil game. I see no reason to speculate on
this topic since almost everything we need to know about the
trouble that we might be in was presented in unambiguous language
by the petroleum scientist and executive Donald E. Carr (1978):
“The clock of stupidity is attached to a bell, and it tolls for
your descendants”. It probably tolls for us too, but I prefer
waiting until later in the year before thinking about that.
References:
Banks, Ferdinand E. (2007). The Political Economy of World
Energy: an Introductory textbook. Singapore, London, and New York:
World Scientific.
Carr, Donald E. (1978). ‘Energy and Earth Machine’. London:
Sphere Books Ltd.
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