The energy ties that bring Turkey and Iran together
by John C.K. Daly
30-11-07
One casualty of the Bush administration's ambiguous attempts to mollify
Turkey over the issue of clamping down on Kurdish insurgents in northern
Iraq may well be Washington's larger agenda of isolating Iran.
Ankara and Tehran have signed $ 1.5 bn (EUR 1 bn) in agreements providing
for the joint construction of three 2,000-MW thermal power plants -- two in
Iran and one in Turkey, and several hydroelectric plants in Iran with a
total 10,000-MW capability. The agreements also provide for upgrading
electrical power transmission lines between the two countries.
Under terms of the agreement, Ankara will import 3 bn to 6 bn kWh of
electrical energy annually. At present, Iran exports electricity to Turkey
through two transmission lines totalling 250 MW.
The agreement comes in direct contradiction to Washington's policy of
further isolating Iran over its controversial uranium enrichment program as
the US government mulls preparing to introduce at the UN Security Council a
third round of sanctions penalizing Tehran.
Certainly, the Turkish government was not unaware of the Bush
administration's wishes; recently US Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman held
talks with Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler and expressed Washington's
concerns over any possible energy accords with Iran, maintaining that such
agreements could only encourage Tehran to pursue its nuclear agenda.
In September, US Undersecretary of State for Economic, Energy and
Agricultural Affairs Reuben Jeffery III visited Turkey and told journalists
that Washington expects "Turkey and other governments to help effectively
implement the spirit of not one but two unanimous UN Security Council
sanctions" against Iran because of its nuclear activities, adding helpfully
that Turkey should look for alternative sources of gas supplies, like
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq.
Lest Jeffery's intent be lost, US Undersecretary of State Nicolas Burns
visited Ankara in October and brought up the 1999 US-Iran Sanctions Act,
underwhich foreign companies investing more than $ 20 mm in the Iranian
hydrocarbon sector risk sanctions, but added diplomatically, "All countries
should do their best to sanction Iran on their own, according to their own
laws."
During the joint news conference in Istanbul with Iranian Energy Minister
Parviz Fattah, Guler said, "The signing (of agreements) will continue. Our
efforts are continuing."
Fattah told, "Our improving ties may annoy some circles but they will harm
no one. They have to accept that."
In a pointed reply to Washington's inevitably negative reaction to the
arrangement, Guler said, "At this point, interests of our country are above
everything. These efforts should by no means be considered a reaction, this
is an action."
The reality for Turkey is that it currently imports 90 % of its energy needs
at a time of record-high oil prices, and Ankara's interest is to acquire
reasonably priced energy imports from whatever source is available. In
addressing this economic reality, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan on
Sept. 20 said Turkey relied on imports from Iran and Russia and it would be
"out of the question to stop imports from either country."
Furthermore, Turkey has firsthand experience of the deleterious effects of
US-initiated regional sanctions. Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, UN-imposed sanctions lasted until the outbreak of the US-led war
against Iraq in March 2003. Turkey estimated that because of the sanctions,
it lost $ 80 bn (EUR 55.5 bn) in transit revenues from Iraqi oil exports to
Ceyhan and other trade with Iraq.
Furthermore, the decision of the Turkish Parliament in March 2003 not to
allow the Pentagon to use Turkey as a staging point for the invasion of Iraq
soured relations between Washington and Ankara, producing reverberations
that continue through to the present.
In 2007 two additional items served further to strain US-Turkish relations.
Ill-advised congressional legislation aiming to designate the turbulent
events in eastern Anatolia during World War I, which affected the region's
Armenian population, as genocide, infuriated both the Turkish government and
the Turkish public.
After complaining for months about the rising tempo and intensity of Kurdish
rebel attacks from northern Iraq's Kurdistan region into Turkey, Ankara
massed nearly 100,000 troops on the border before Washington in a flurry of
diplomatic initiatives attempted to avoid a Turkish military incursion by
offering to share military intelligence.
On Nov. 20 US Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright and
the top US commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, held discussions with
Turkish Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Ergin Saygun, after which a
posting on the Turkish General Staff said, "The issues of Iraq, the ongoing
cooperation against the common enemy, the PKK, and comprehensive
intelligence sharing were discussed."
PKK refers to the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party.
It is time for the Bush administration to realize, however belatedly, that
its inattention to Turkish domestic and foreign policy concerns has produced
the growing estrangement between the two nations and that Washington has
nothing to offer Ankara in the energy sphere except criticism.
The Erdogan government, as a necessity, has accordingly moved national
energy concerns ahead of placating US foreign-policy initiatives.
As unsettling as Washington finds the recent Iranian-Turkish energy
agreements, worse may follow, as Turkey has reportedly reached a $ 3 bn (EUR
2.1 bn) agreement with Iran to develop phases 22-24 of the Caspian offshore
South Pars project, while potential pipeline projects include 2,200 miles of
gas pipelines to transport up to 40 bn cm of gas annually to Europe via
Turkey.
Turkish and many EU politicians believe that rather then pressuring Iran,
perhaps it's time for Washington to reconsider the entire issue of sanctions
against Tehran.
Source: www.energy-daily.com / United Press International |