| The U.S. Carbon Market by Alison Wise, National Renewable Energy Lab
 May 20, 2008
 Q: There is so much talk today about carbon legislation that I'd like to ask 
    a really basic question. How do carbon markets work? And how do they help 
    foster the development of renewable energy? -- Danny B., Whitehouse Station, 
    NJ
 A:
 
 Despite the name, carbon markets do not trade existing carbon. They trade 
    the reduction of carbon emissions into the atmosphere. So, like other 
    emissions trading schemes, such as the sulfur dioxide "market" that helped 
    to reduce the acid rain problem here in the U.S. over the last twenty years, 
    carbon markets would theoretically mitigate carbon emissions as part of the 
    effort to address climate change. Of course, there are problems other than 
    climate change that come about with a carbon intensive economy. Fluctuating 
    fossil fuel prices, dependence on politically unstable regions for the 
    energy that fuels our economy, pollution issues such as the Exxon Valdez 
    spill, as well as increasing concern about the theoretical phenomenon of 
    "peak oil" all are weaknesses of a carbon intensive energy system.
 
 Ultimately, however, carbon markets today are principally based within the 
    context of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction and the growing public concern 
    about our warming planet and the catastrophe this could pose. The idea is 
    straightforward at first glance, but becomes fairly complex rather quickly 
    in terms of actual measured emission reduction as well as "unintended 
    consequences."
 
 Carbon Market Definition
 
 Carbon markets can be either voluntary or mandatory. In a voluntary carbon 
    market, an entity (company, individual, or another "emitter") volunteers to 
    offset its carbon emissions by purchasing carbon allowances from a third 
    party, who then takes this money and uses it towards a project that will 
    reduce carbon in the atmosphere. These projects include planting trees 
    (natural carbon sequestration) or investment in renewable energy generation 
    (the additional renewable capacity reduces fossil fuel use from a 
    traditional carbon-emitting energy source).
 
 Compliance carbon markets function under a regulated limit to carbon 
    emissions (a "cap" on emissions), where permits or "allowances" are given or 
    auctioned to carbon emitters who then have to figure out how to conduct 
    their business within this set limit. This creates a market for these 
    allowances, where lower emitting entities can trade their extra allowances 
    to those who need the additional capacity, hence the term "cap-and-trade" 
    carbon markets.
 
 The European Example
 
 To understand a bit more about how these carbon markets work (or how they 
    sometimes don't work), let's take a look across the Atlantic. The EU 
    Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first international initiative to 
    attempt to tackle this type of GHG market. It is a compliance market, 
    functioning as a cap-and-trade and a credit-and-trade system under mandates 
    set by the Kyoto Protocol. Article 17 of this accord sets up an ETS, where 
    Annex I countries can exchange emission permits between them or trade 
    emissions reductions from the investment projects made abroad under what are 
    called the Kyoto mechanisms (Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM's) if they 
    take place in countries with no carbon limit, Joint Implementation (JI's) if 
    they take place in countries with a carbon limit). The EU ETS represents 
    about 65% of the total volume of carbon traded worldwide representing $19 
    billion in 2006 according to The Climate Group, an international NGO 
    (non-governmental organization) that tracks growing carbon markets.
 
 Potential Market Pitfalls
 
 There have been two prominent snafus in the roll-out of the EU ETS. The 
    first concerns the creation of the allowance market itself. Evidently, the 
    initial dispersal of allowances "over-allocated" them. In other words, the 
    emissions cap as it was set did not match up with the number of allowances 
    that were allocated to emitters. So, the market had the wrong signals and it 
    took some time for the price to adjust.
 
 The second issue, and potentially a more entrenched one, surrounds the CDM's 
    and accountability. Emitters in the developed countries of the EU will often 
    seek the lowest-cost way to satisfy their emissions reductions, often in the 
    form of a CDM in a developing country. Within this decision are some 
    potential problems: Is the project an additional reduction effort, or would 
    the project have taken place anyway in a BAU (business as usual) situation 
    (otherwise known as "additionality")? Can the project's emissions reductions 
    be verified? Does the project create fewer GHG emissions, but produce other 
    environmental and/or social problems? All of these concerns are creating 
    increasing criticism of the EU ETS as it is currently run and have led to 
    the United Nations raising the bar on approving these CDMs. This creates 
    additional investment risks associated with the market, as projects that are 
    slated to commence to fulfill reductions may be unable to pass muster.
 
 Accountability and Oversight
 
 There is also an issue surrounding the appropriate enforcement and oversight 
    mechanism and/or institution for verifying emissions reductions and trading. 
    This applies not only to verification of emissions reductions claims, but 
    also oversight to make sure that "double-counting" of reductions doesn't 
    occur. That is, when multiple stakeholders take credit for distinct emission 
    reductions that should only be attributed to one emitter.
 
 In the United States, third party NGO's have stepped in within voluntary 
    markets to fulfill this function, but their role is questioned by corporate 
    watchdog groups who suspect that being reliant on corporate funding for 
    their existence compromises their objectivity. There has been some talk 
    about establishing a "self regulatory organization" like the Securities and 
    Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate a compliance carbon market here in the 
    U.S. should national cap-and-trade legislation pass. Some sort of 
    independent global stakeholder may need to be created to fill this role 
    internationally (the definition of independent to be determined). Whatever 
    the solution, it cannot be overstated that the success of the carbon market 
    will be based on the trust between its participants.
 
 Carbon Markets in the U.S.
 
 Which brings us back to the United States, where, by all accounts, there 
    appears to be some sort of national carbon legislation on the horizon and 
    where several regional initiatives are already in place. For a complete 
    overview of all the legislation that's currently on the table, the Pew 
    Center on Global Climate Change provides a spreadsheet that outlines all of 
    the particulars.
 
 Ultimately, for a carbon market to have traction it needs to be fungible; it 
    needs to be able to act like financial markets that can navigate 
    internationally. But in the meantime, we have a growing voluntary market and 
    several regional compliance markets already underway. The Chicago Climate 
    Exchange is the largest voluntary carbon trading system in the U.S., trading 
    $36.5 million worth of offsets in 2006 (some of this may represent renewable 
    energy investments). And the U.S. is home to the largest provider of carbon 
    offsets by volume; the Climate Trust had reduced carbon emissions by four 
    million metric tons by the end of 2005.
 
 In California, AB 32 has been signed into law mandating greenhouse gas 
    reduction of 25 percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. The California Air 
    Resources Board is the entity responsible for enforcing this cap, and for 
    making plans and rules that will implement the goal. It is expected to 
    introduce a cap-and-trade system to achieve these reductions.
 
 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI-pronounced "Reggie") is a 
    regional cap-and-trade system for participating Northeast states that has 
    just experienced its first trades. An option trade between EcoSys Capital 
    Adviser and energy trader Vitol was the inaugural transaction on February 
    14th, 2008. The next trade was a forward trade placing a price for 
    allowances at $7 a ton, putting an annual value for the RGGI market at $1.3 
    billion. These regional and voluntary markets are testing grounds for future 
    carbon market growth.
 
 Carbon and Renewables
 
 The broader question of how carbon market development relates to renewable 
    energy development is a bit tricky. Right now, it is safe to say that any 
    price tag associated with carbon could be good for renewables in the long 
    run as carbon intensive energy generation becomes more expensive, making 
    renewable energy generation more cost competitive in comparison. And within 
    voluntary markets, sometimes renewable energy projects are created to 
    represent an emissions offset so one could argue this builds the renewable 
    market directly.
 
 But there is some tension in the ultimate design within carbon pricing. The 
    question becomes, are we designing a system that rewards least-cost carbon 
    mitigation that may continue our reliance on carbon intensive fuels by 
    focusing on cleaner emissions and projects that don't necessarily displace 
    carbon intensive fuel dependence? Or are we designing a system that rewards 
    emissions reductions through efficiency measures and innovation in terms of 
    both carbon mitigation and renewable energy development?
 
 Interestingly, if we focus solely on carbon sequestration and other 
    technologies that create cleaner carbon emissions, these applications could 
    potentially compete with renewables within a trading framework that ideally 
    would reward all solutions to climate issues.
 
 If, for example, Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) are not bundled with 
    Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) then there is a potential for emissions 
    reductions to be sourced solely from carbon mitigation and not renewable 
    projects (based largely on current costs). Basically, renewable energy 
    projects impact overall carbon emissions. As emissions are reduced as these 
    renewables come online, the carbon quota should decrease to reflect this in 
    order to maintain the right price signals in the market and to ensure that 
    renewables are associated with emissions reductions. This market performance 
    is facilitated by linking RECs and CERs.
 
 This is one example of the way in which carbon and renewables impact each 
    other, which brings us to the observation that it is important for renewable 
    energy proponents to follow carbon issues. We should keep close watch on the 
    technology that is being developed that would mitigate carbon problems 
    through sequestration and emissions reductions as a potential market 
    competitor. But perhaps more importantly, we need to be well informed about 
    policy that addresses carbon to look for a framework for synergy between 
    these technologies and renewables.
 
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