North-south energy routes more attractive than
east-west ones
by Paul Goble
24-01-09
Many Western analysts have suggested that one reason Russian aviators
dropped a bomb only 50 meters from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline during
Moscow's invasion of Georgia in August was to highlight how insecure that
link between the Caspian and the West which bypasses Russian territory has
become.
But without acknowledging that sending such a message was among the
Kremlin's war aims, Moscow commentator Aleksandr Shustov argues that "one of
the important consequences of the war" has been growing recognition by all
parties of just how "insecure" all pipelines and other transportation
arteries through Georgia are (http://fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1880). And
that forceful demonstration has renewed interest in the north-south route
despite American opposition to any pipeline across Iran and the desire of
both the US and the EU that Moscow not he in a position to control all
hydrocarbon exports from the region and thus use gas and oil as a political
weapon against both exporters and importers.
In his article, Shustov traces the history of TRACECA, the group of
countries committed to the transit of gas and oil and other goods over what
some have called a revived "Great Silk Road," the key role that Georgia and
Azerbaijan have played as transit states for these hydrocarbons, and the way
in which Armenia and Iran have been largely excluded this project.
Shustov acknowledges that "despite the technical, geographic and legal
complexities" of the east-west route, its backers and participants "have
been able to achieve [some] definite successes," including the development
of a network of logistical centres, the training of support personnel, and
the construction of the pipelines themselves.
But not even all these very real achievements were able to transcend
geography or bring stability to Georgia, the Moscow analyst continues, and
that reality, one that many supporters of the east-west route typically have
been unwilling to acknowledge, was brought home to them as a most unpleasant
"surprise" by the five-day way between Moscow and Tbilisi. Not only did the
conflict force several exporting countries to suspend shipments during the
war, but earlier this month, Azerbaijani officials announced that they were
putting off until March the construction of their part of the railroad that
was to supplement the work of the pipelines.
Baku blamed "complex weather conditions in winter and the need to conduct
additional geological studies of the route," but Shustov suggests that its
decision reflected a growing awareness in the Azerbaijan capital that no
transit route across Georgia is going to be entirely secure for the
foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the Moscow analyst argues, plans to establish a North-South
transportation corridor "received a new impulse" after the war. This
corridor has a long history. In September 2000, Russia, India and Iran
signed an agreement to promote it, an agreement later acceded to by
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Oman and Syria. The agreement
calls for the development of three major north-south routes that would link
Russia with Iran, Shustov notes: via the Caspian Sea, via a railroad through
Azerbaijan, and via pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The chief economic attraction of this corridor is that it is only half as
long as the traditional sea route via the Suez Canal between the producing
and exporting countries of the Caspian Basin and the Persian Gulf, on the
one hand, and the importing and consuming countries of Western Europe, on
the other.
But its political attractions not only to Moscow but also to Tehran and
Yerevan are almost certainly an even greater selling point. For Moscow, it
would mean that much of the Caspian Basin oil and gas would flow across its
territory and at the very least would not flow through pipelines sponsored
by the United States. That would enhance Moscow's influence not only in the
countries directly benefiting from exports and transit of oil and gas via
this route but also in other countries, such as Azerbaijan, which would
likely conclude that coming to terms with Russian preferences is a better
strategy than waiting for the West to back them up.
For Tehran, it would help it project power into the region and represent a
serious end run around American efforts to isolate it economically and
politically. And for Yerevan, it would represent not only a major source of
income from transit fees but reduce pressure on Armenia to settle the
Karabakh dispute on terms it does not find acceptable.
Armenia, Shustov continues, hoped to benefit from a rail line crossing its
territory from Russia to Iran. But because such a route would pass through
and thus require approval from Georgia and Abkhazia, it is probably
"impossible," at least at present. But the north-south corridor would give
Armenia another route out -- via Iran to the Persian Gulf.
The Russian invasion of Georgia did not end interest in the east-west
corridor, but the conflict made the problems of this route more obvious. And
consequently, while this outcome may not have been a Russian war aim, it is,
as Shustov's article makes clear, very much one that the Russian government
is pleased with.
Source:
http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com |