The chief drilling engineer for the Minerals Management Service, New Orleans Office, said May 11 that the agency has no role in certifying blowout preventers, a statement that seemed to surprise Coast Guard Captain Hung Ngyuen, co-chair of a joint investigation of the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon.

"Who is certifying the self-certification?" Nguyen asked. Frank Patton, drilling engineer for MMS in New Orleans, said the industry, in general, certifies that they comply by standards set by the American Petroleum Institute.

Patton, though, later said a blowout preventer is "probably the most important factor in maintaining the safety," of a rig and personnel. Patton could provide few details about the well, referring instead to newspaper reports of the parties involved in the incident.

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As it has during other crises affecting the oil and other energy markets, such as hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Ike, Platts is producing this special summary of events surrounding the Deepwater Horizon rig disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. This special joint edition of Platts Oilgram News and OPR Extra will be published as frequently as Platts believes necessary to give its readers a quick summary of developments surrounding the leak at the wellhead, the growing footprint of the spill, and the impact these occurrences are having on markets and on US federal energy policy.

 

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Jason Mathews, an MMS official on the six-member joint Coast Guard and MMS board, said MMS regulations require would-be drillers to submit proof that the blowout preventer they use can shear a drill pipe, but Patton said he was not aware of any such requirement and never demands it from the more than 100 applications his office reviews every year.

On the first day of hearings on May 11 in suburban New Orleans, federal and company officials pressed for details on the firefighting response to the rig explosion, asking several witnesses if the firefighting effort was coordinated and who was responsible for the effort. A witness from the US Coast Guard said firefighting was not one of its responsibilities.

Most of the testimony of the joint investigation focused on the crewmembers of the M/V Damon Bankston, a Tidewater Marine vessel, their recollection of the moments before the April 20 explosion aboard the rig, and the rescue of the 115 crewmembers from the rig in the hours after. The Bankston was hooked by a mud hose to Transocean's Deepwater Horizon when the accident occurred. Three Bankston crewmembers testified that mud erupted from the well before the first of several explosions.

Mud was "raining down" from the rig, said Captain Alwin Landry, safety officer aboard the Bankston. Crewmembers reported hearing a release of air or gas from the rig, a 20-30 second release that seemed longer than usual. The Deepwater Horizon Captain Curt Kuchta then told the Bankston to move away from the rig because they "were having trouble with the well," Landry added.

Soon after, the first of several explosions occurred. Paul Erickson, chief mate aboard the Bankston, said that after the mud explosion about 9:30 pm, he saw a "white liquid" coming up out of the derrick on the rig. He could not identify the liquid, which could have been seawater, he said. Erickson said a fire ignited on top of that liquid and was not extinguished. he said that shortly before the air release, he noticed that a couple of birds fell from the sky.

Erickson told the panel that, "we were aware there had been some problems with the well." He said that several weeks prior he had been told by someone with BP or Transocean that the well was "non-typically difficult."

Before the explosion, the Damon Bankston was taking mud off the drilling rig, before being told to stop at 5:17 pm At about 9 pm crewmembers began hearing a release of air from the rig. A major explosion was reported at 9:53 pm

Samples of mud that fell from the rig were taken from the Bankston's deck and showed bits of rock and concrete, said David Dykes of MMS.

Following the explosion, the Bankston unhooked its hose, moved away from the Deepwater Horizon, and began rescue operations.

Anthony Gervasio, an engineer aboard the Bankston, helped pull about six people out of the water who had jumped from the rig, and towed a lifeboat filled with rig workers to safety.

The Bankston rescued 115 rig members from the Deepwater Horizon.

"I am pretty confident that everyone that was able to abandon ship was recovered," Landry said. The Bankston stayed on scene until the following morning when a Coast Guard ship arrived. The Bankston then made two stops to pick up investigators from BP, Transocean, MMS and the Coast Guard, before docking at Port Fourchon on April 21.

Kevin Robb, Coast Guard Eighth District search and rescue specialist, said the search for survivors was called off after 80 hours of searching an area the "size of Connecticut." The Coast Guard conducted 28 separate land and air searches.

"What you're looking for in these circumstances is about the size of a volleyball, a human head," said Robb, the first witness on May 11. Robb said that Admiral Mary Landry made the call to stop the search for any survivors. Eleven men are presumed dead.

Nguyen opened the hearing with a moment of silence for the 11 men. He listed the designated parties of interest as BP, Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron, M-I Swaco, Dril Quip, Anadarko, MOEX and Weatherford. Those parties have the right to submit questions during the hearing. After hearings end May 12, a second round is set for May 25-May 29.