EMP: A Poorly Understood Threat
Grid security managers are experiencing growing
concern over cyber security while another serious
threat, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), has received very
little attention. An electromagnetic pulse attack can
have a devastating impact on the grid, rendering it
useless perhaps for many years. While it is generally
considered a low frequency/high consequence threat,
recent developments regarding both human-caused EMP and
the likelihood of geomagnetic storms significantly
increase the chances of a major hit. Protective activity
needs to be jump-started if appropriate measures are to
be in place before it's too late.
The American public is poorly informed about this threat
and therefore is making no demand on their utility
companies to take action. Our state and national
legislatures are equally uninformed so there is no
serious allocation of funds to support utility
preparation. The public, in ignorance, is not demanding
anything from their legislators. Yet, time is becoming a
critical factor. Some exceptions to the general
inattention given to EMP are (1) Alaska has passed
legislation to study the issue, and (2) the University
of Maryland has given an R&D grant to Instant Access
Networks LLC to develop EMP-hardened renewable energy
systems.
The EMP threat is real and it comes from a number of
different sources. An intentional attack can be launched
by an adversary using a scud or ballistic missile to
detonate a nuclear device high over the U.S. A scud can
be launched from a ship offshore to detonate a nuclear
device at an altitude of 25 to 40 miles, which would
impact an area with a diameter of 200 to 300 miles. A
ballistic missile could achieve an altitude of 300
miles. At that height, if centered over Kansas, a
detonation would impact all three of our major grids.
The attack, launched at sea with the ship quickly sunk,
would not identify the adversary for a counterattack. An
adversarial attack can therefore be launched without the
fear of immediate retribution.
The level of devastation would be enormous. The nuclear
blast emits a powerful pulse that strikes in three
distinct portions, each with a different character. The
first, called E1, has a high peak amplitude which
radiates in less than one billionth of a second and
couples effectively to all electronic systems regardless
of size. It is too fast to be captured by lightning
arrestors or other conventional protective devices. It
mainly destroys electronic equipment including
electronic protective equipment.
The second, E2, has lower amplitude and couples
effectively through long lines to networked systems.
Protective devices that would normally handle this
portion will have been disabled by the first portion. It
saturates the cores of both generators and transformers.
The third portion, E3, hits the ground and creates a
ground-induced current (GIC) which is slow and
long-lasting. The GIC is called geomagnetic-induced
current when solar-sourced due to the geomagnetic storm
from which the pulse is derived. E3 is a largely DC
component which offsets the AC waveform and couples with
long power transmission lines that lead it right into
transformers and generators, where it destroys the
already saturated cores.
Solar storms present a major EMP threat. Also called
"severe space weather", a major solar storm can wreak
havoc on our grids. An example is the severe space
weather event that hit the Hydro-Quebec power system in
Canada in March, 1989. Automatic voltage compensation
equipment failed, resulting in a voltage collapse. Five
transmission lines from James Bay were tripped, causing
a generation loss of 9,450 MW. With a load of about
21,350 MW, the system collapsed within seconds resulting
in a nine-hour blackout for the Province of Quebec.
During this same storm, a large step-up transformer
failed at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey.
There were about 200 less severe events reported in the
North American power system.
The online Operations Manual of the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) cites
geomagnetic storms of 1957, 1958, 1968, 1970, 1972,
1974, 1979, 1982, and 1989 as causes of major power
system disturbances. However, "major" is a comparative
term and may be inappropriate for those storms
considering the destructive capability of the storms of
1859 and 1921. The former is the strongest ever recorded
but the weaker 1921 storm was many times stronger than
those cited by NERC. If a storm of that intensity were
to occur during the increasing solar activity of the
next few years, it would destroy most of the power
equipment on our grids.
A National Research Council-sponsored workshop on the
societal and economic impact of an EMP hit on our grids
was held in February, 2008. It concluded that the
consequences of a major storm would be catastrophic,
dwarfing the damage from Hurricane Katrina and lasting 4
to 10 years. If we don't take steps to mitigate the
impact, civilization as we know it would be destroyed.
You can just imagine the consequences of instantly
having no electricity across the nation for as long as
10 years.
It is truly remarkable how well our power systems have
been improved by electronics to provide for much greater
efficiency and safety. SCADA, as well as digital control
systems and programmable logic controllers, have
enhanced the operation and automation of power systems
allowing for remote operation and the effective
operation of very complex networks. This can be viewed
as both a blessing and a curse, the latter due to the
increased vulnerability of the network to EMP and other
forms of electromagnetic interference.
The response to major blackouts over the past half
century has been to develop protective methods and
regulations that have helped to avoid many of the
pitfalls of the past. Unfortunately, the damage from a
nuclear blast or a massive solar storm cannot be averted
with existing protective equipment. New devices and
methods will be needed.
Two new factors are now playing a role in this
complexity: the advent of the smart grid and the growing
need for cyber security. Both are drawing the attention
of grid security personnel, perhaps to the detriment of
attention needed to develop better protection from EMP.
The security component of the smart grid program is
mainly oriented to protection from cyber crime as the
expanded communication system needed for a smart grid
opens up more opportunities for cyber attacks.
While electronics and microelectronics are omnipresent
in today's grid environment, the smart grid will greatly
increase their numbers. It will maximize the use of
integrated circuits to manage every step from the
generator to the consumer. If they are the first victims
in a major EMP event, all of that investment would be
for naught.
The potential for an EMP event is very real. The
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States
from Electromagnetic Pulse (aka EMP Commission) has
vividly described how our adversaries can fairly easily
launch a nuclear attack for which our grid currently has
no significant defense. (The report is available on the
commission's website.) The capability of our adversaries
to launch a deadly attack is constantly increasing while
our capability to defend against such an attack is
constantly decreasing. An EMP attack could also be at
ground level from small, high-energy EMP generators with
varying levels of capability. Another source could be an
explosion of a chemical plant. While these local EMP
strikes would not cripple the nation, they could still,
through a cascade effect, endanger some millions of
Americans at the regional level.
In the recently released Final Report of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
United States, chaired by former Secretaries of Defense
William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, there is the
statement:
"We note also that the United States has done little to
reduce its vulnerability to attack with electromagnetic
pulse weapons and recommend that current investments in
modernizing the national power grid take account of this
risk."
While efforts are underway to manufacture special
grounding devices that could protect large generators
and transformers from EMP damage, they are not yet ready
for market. Also, there may be too little interest on
the part of utility companies to devote financial
resources to deploy them. The first step for utility
security personnel is to study the potential for damage.
A major EMP strike falls into the category of low
frequency/high consequence and it is debatable how much
should be spent when there is a relatively small chance
that a major strike will occur. However, the
consequences of a strike are so enormous that it cannot
be ignored. Also, as the sun moves from a very quiet
period to an energetic phase, due to peak in 2013, the
chances of a less-than-major storm that would still
cause considerable damage are much higher and the cost
of protection less challenging. Grid security budgets
will need to be enhanced to afford protective systems,
both to counter the E1 portion that would damage
electronics and to counter the stronger subsequent
portions that would destroy generators and transformers.
Scientists are divided on the prospects for a major
geomagnetic storm during the next active solar period.
NOAA and NASA scientists are predicting a weak solar
maximum in 2013 but this can be confusing as the great
geomagnetic storm of 1859 occurred during a weak solar
maximum.
The EMP threat has been very rarely mentioned in utility
publications. Much more media exposure is needed. Grid
security personnel, electric utility company executives,
legislatures, government agencies, and the public at
large need to learn about and appreciate the nature of
this threat. They should start to learn about steps that
can be taken at local, state, regional and national
levels to mitigate this enormous potential for
destruction. More emphasis needs to be placed on the
development of local, protected renewable-energy
generators which could provide at least a minimal power
supply if the regional or national grid becomes
dysfunctional.
Time is critical. Recent press reports show that North
Korea is getting closer to a nuclear weapon and is
actively developing its missile capability. The EMP
Commission identified a number of potential sources that
could launch an EMP attack. The next solar maximum is
less than four years from now and the sun doesn't need
to reach a solar maximum for a major geomagnetic storm
to occur. Protective measures will take time to put into
place. The time for action is now.
http://www.energycentral.com/gridtandd/communicationsandsecurity/articles/2106/EMP-A-Poorly-Understood-Threat/