Social Unrest Widens in Turkey

The protests that have convulsed Istanbul, Ankara and other Turkish cities in recent days were entirely unexpected but they embody a mood of frustration, anger and disempowerment that has been building for years. A diverse—and by no means united—cross section of Turkish society feels increasingly resentful of the direction the country is taking under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, its divisive but hugely successful prime minister. The scale of the protests will eventually diminish, but the prospect of increased social unrest over a prolonged period has risen significantly.

The polarisation of Turkish society is generally understood in terms of a clash between the religious conservatism of Mr Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the secularism of the parties he has roundly defeated in three successive general elections. There is a significant element of this behind the protests, which erupted not long after the introduction of legal changes restricting the sale of alcohol and banning its promotion. However, the frustrations that animate the protestors run deeper than this and relate to the steady fraying of Turkey's already weak social fabric as Mr Erdogan's time in office has gone on.

Rampant commercialism

One of the concerns here is the relentless commercialism of his government and its push for urban development, particularly in Istanbul. Some of this development has been much needed and long overdue given the city's rapid expansion in recent decades. But it has occurred with no sense of planning, little consideration for quality of life and more than a whiff of crony capitalism. Thus, the starting point for the protests was Gezi Park, one of the few green areas in the heart of Istanbul, which was due to be razed to make way for the construction of yet another shopping mall. Mr Erdogan has also recently broken ground for the construction of a third bridge across the Bosphorus, which will lead to the development of Istanbul's relatively unspoilt northern hinterland.

Democracy Erdogan-style

A more fundamental concern that underpins the protests is with the nature of Mr Erdogan's rule. He has always been a brash, charismatic and ambitious politician, but as the years have gone by—he became prime minister in 2003—Mr Erdogan has become increasingly abrasive and dismissive of his opponents. Democracy has weak roots in Turkey—in large part a legacy of previous secularist governments as well as repeated military interventions—and Mr Erdogan has used this to his advantage. He has, in effect, defined democracy in his own image as something that involves winning elections and then doing as you please. He was blunt about this when speaking in response to the protests. He pointed to the majority he had won at the last election and said that he did not need to ask the losers' permission to develop Gezi Park. In response, the president, Abdullah Gul, a co-founder of the AKP and deputy leader of the party until he became head of state in 2007, warned that democracy is not just about elections.

Even by Mr Erdogan's standards, the uncompromising nature of the response to the protests has been extraordinary. Police brutality has been rampant and sustained. Tear gas and pepper spray have been in almost constant use, and the number of head injuries—including lost eyes—suggest that tear gas canisters have been deliberately fired at protesters. One of the lowest points reached was the firing of tear gas into a hospital where people were being treated for their earlier exposure to the same gas.

Less surprisingly, the Turkish media were initially reluctant to cover the protests, seemingly concerned not to upset Mr Erdogan and the ruling party. Fearing prosecution or dismissal for criticising the government, many Turkish editors and journalists have become accustomed to exercising self-censorship when it comes to government decisions.

"Arab Spring" analogy unhelpful

There have been frequent attempts to draw analogies between what is happening in Turkey now and the wave of "Arab Spring" uprisings in the wider Middle East. These comparisons obscure more than they reveal. Despite some of the protesters' slogans, Mr Erdogan is not a dictator and despite many serious problems Turkey is not a police state. That said, the response to the protests has made things much worse than they were previously. Turkey's political culture has been polarised for a long a time, but it may now be poisoned in a way that was not the case before. There were relatively simple and low-cost conciliatory steps that Mr Erdogan could have taken to ease tensions and drain the protests of momentum. Instead, he has ratcheted up the confrontation at every opportunity.

Credible parliamentary opposition wanted

In a healthy democracy, opposition parties would long ago have tapped into mounting disenchantment with Mr Erdogan and his AKP. But Turkey's opposition has been ineffectual in the extreme since it was decimated at the 2001 general election. The absence of a credible opposition is one of the main reasons that so many protesters have taken to the streets—they feel unable to influence things at the ballot box and then ignored or worse between elections. But it also raises questions as to what the fallout from the protests is likely to be. With no political party through which to channel demands for political change, it is unclear what will come of the protesters' sense of anger, which is now seething in the wake of the police clampdown. It may well fester unhealthily. The scale of the protests will diminish, but the prospect of increased social unrest over a prolonged period has risen significantly

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