Two of the most striking developments have been the declines
in the Japanese yen and the British pound. The yen has fallen by
about 16% against the US dollar since the end of September last
year, and the pound has fallen by close to 7% against the US
dollar in the past eight weeks. Fluctuations in global risk
appetite, and in particular in confidence in the euro, have been
the defining force in shaping currency movements in the past
couple of years. But the recent sharp depreciations in the yen
and the pound represent something of a departure from this
pattern.
In both cases, domestic factors have been significant drivers
of these currencies' depreciation. For example, while the easing
of financial stresses in the euro zone since mid-2012 has
reduced the yen's appeal as a safe-haven currency, this alone
does not explain the yen's fall. Rather, the pivotal moment for
the yen was Japan's general election on December 16th, which
resulted in a change of government and a new direction for
economic policy.
As is so often the case, foreign-exchange markets priced in
many of these changes before the fact. In the run-up to the
election, the yen weakened as currency traders anticipated a
victory for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The currency has
fallen further since the start of 2013 as the LDP has duly
assumed power and started fulfilling its campaign promises. Most
notably, it has exerted pressure on the Bank of Japan (BOJ)—as
it threatened to do—to ease monetary policy further. The central
bank responded at its January policy meeting by committing to a
2% inflation target and by announcing an open-ended programme of
quantitative easing (QE). Both changes are significant, even
though the new QE programme will not take effect until 2014. The
government has also announced fiscal stimulus measures,
underscoring its commitment to ending Japan's decades-long
deflationary cycle.
In the UK, too, the currency's movements reflect a
combination of domestic and global forces. During periods of
market stress the pound had caught a bid as a relative safe
haven. As the euro zone crisis has eased, mainly because of the
success of efforts by the European Central Bank (ECB), the pound
has lost this safe-haven appeal: it weakened steadily against
the euro from July 2012 to the end of last year. Yet its descent
against the European single currency has steepened since the
start of 2013; recently it has also started depreciating sharply
against the US dollar. In large part this reflects efforts by
the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England to "talk
down" the pound, as well as unexpected signs that the committee
is more open to further QE than previously thought. Weak GDP
data, rising concerns about the impact of austerity on economic
growth and related uncertainty over future fiscal policy given
slow progress in reducing the budget deficit have also
contributed to the decline in sterling. Some observers doubtless
also interpret the UK's loss of its AAA sovereign
rating—following a downgrade by Moody's, a credit ratings
agency—as negative for sterling. However, we prefer to see the
downgrade as reflecting pre-existing pressures on the pound and
on the UK economy rather than as a market-moving event per
se.
All roads lead to Rome
If the declines in the yen and the pound mark new directions,
the prevailing global narrative of the past couple of years
probably remains intact. This dynamic, in which investors
alternate between "risk on" and "risk off" positions, has partly
manifested itself in fluctuations in the euro/US dollar exchange
rate. The dollar weakened against the euro between July 2012 and
January 2013 as the ECB's defence of the European single
currency—most notably its promise of unlimited intervention in
sovereign bond markets—eased fears of a disorderly break-up of
the euro zone. The euro was further bolstered as European banks
started to repay loans that the ECB had provided in late 2011
and early 2012 as part of its debt-crisis response. However,
since the start of February this year markets have gone into
reverse, and the euro has given up part of its gains, falling
from around US$1.37:€1 to US$1.30:€1.
Political uncertainty in Italy has been a factor in this
reversal. The approach of the February 24th-25th general
election heightened concerns about governability and thus about
the country's ability to implement economic reforms needed to
boost competitiveness. The inconclusive result of the election
is likely to compound such fears, keeping downward pressure on
the euro. The other side of the same coin is the improving
economic picture in the US, along with the easing of short-term
fears over the "fiscal cliff" and federal "debt ceiling". Both
of these issues had the potential to seriously disrupt US
financial markets in early 2013, but in the event the problems
did not materialise as initially feared.
Tangled strands
The outlook for currency markets in the rest of 2013 is
uncertain. Fluctuations in global risk appetite will remain a
fundamental driver of exchange-rate movements, but market
signals may well be confused by myriad other developments.
On the plus side for the euro, we expect the recession in the
euro zone as a whole to end by the middle of 2013—albeit with
any recovery likely to remain weak and skewed heavily towards
Germany. Yet we also expect the US economy to pick up from
mid-year, and the relative effects on currency movements of one
recovery versus the other are hard to predict. A complicating
factor is the dollar's safe-haven status, which can cause it to
move inversely to US economic fundamentals and could therefore
prompt a shift away from the dollar as risk appetite improves.
The euro, in contrast, tends to behave more like a risk asset
(rising, like equities, when sentiment improves and falling when
sentiment weakens).
There are many other events on the horizon that have the
potential to cause turbulence in foreign-exchange markets this
year. Failure by Italy to form a stable post-election government
is an obvious risk, and the approach of the German federal
election in September clouds prospects for co-operation between
euro member states on policies affecting the future of the
currency union. The possibility of renewed financial turmoil in
peripheral euro zone markets will, in any event, remain a
constant threat in the background, capable of erupting whenever
data cast doubt on economic recovery or fiscal consolidation
prospects.
Elsewhere, currency investors must worry about the imminent
approach of automatic public spending cuts in the US that could
impinge on growth prospects. In Japan, the government's
commitment to stronger stimulus, while admirable in theory, may
not have the desired effect in practice. Monetary policy remains
in flux because of an ongoing management transition at the BOJ.
Even if this transition goes to plan, it is far from clear
whether the BOJ is capable of meeting its new 2% inflation
target. With all of the Big Four central banks involved in
asset-purchase programmes to varying degrees, messaging on their
plans for QE will also be important. All these factors could
play into global currency markets in the short term.
In the longer term, the US economy looks the most resilient
of the major OECD currency areas to (slow) interest-rate rises.
If this occurs in a context of a narrowing current-account
deficit (reflecting the impact of shale energy on the US balance
of payments and possibly a renaissance of US manufacturing), the
better relative returns on US-dollar assets should be positive
for the dollar's value.

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