California's Nuclear Examination Centers on Who Knew What and When They Knew It

California is now wrestling with the fate of a single nuclear plant in Southern California. And while the fierce debate will no doubt have broader ramifications for the entire sector, the ordeal is weighing heavily on just one utility: Edison International’s Southern California Edison.

One issue is who knew what and when they might have known it. That’s something that federal investigators are now examining -- findings that will certainly determine whether SoCalEd can restart its long-idled San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, or SONGS. Both the utility and its vendor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, say that while the steam generators in question were installed in 2009-2010, they were unaware of the “vibrations” inside of the vessels that ultimately led to the discovery of a small radiation leak in January 2012. 

Further questions have been raised by two key U.S. lawmakers: Senator Barbara Boxer, D-Calif. and Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass. They maintain that “confidential” documents written by Mitsubishi show that both companies knew of design flaws in the 2009-2010 timeframe. If their suspicions are founded -- an investigation is now occurring and any judgement should be withheld -- then it would have profound implications for the companies. That is, the withholding of any relevant material to existing or would-be shareholders would entail hefty civil penalties and perhaps criminal consequences. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has been asked to look into the allegations. 

Frank Gillespie, senior vice president for Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, graciously walked this reporter through the timeline and has tried to explain how the internal Mitsubishi document to which Boxer and Markey refer is not a smoking gun. 

He says that his company made this document available to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is October 2012 -- in full form. It released a redacted version of that document to the public in February 2013. He emphasizes that mindful businesses will always review their work and that such assessments can only occur in an open and confidential setting. While such discussions are never intended to become public, the company wants to make clear the record. 

“Any withholdings to the NRC could be considered a criminal offense,” says Gillespie. He explains that the wear and tear of the tubes was caused by an uncommon type of “vibration” that had not been seen in 40 years. That phenomenon combined with the relative high power output for the size of the generator, which created a high-velocity steam that impacted the tubes that wore down.  

“There are 10,000 tubes packed into big vessels,” Gillespie explains. “They are a quarter inch apart. Until you install and actually run the steam generators, there is no precursor what happened.” 

Safety First

The first steam generator at SONGS, or Unit 2, was installed in fall of 2009. It ran for 22 months and it went through a planned outage and the normal refueling process in January 2012. At the same time, Unit 3 was half way through its fueling cycle. It had to be shut down 11 months later on January 31, 2012 because of the radiation leak. He said that operators cannot detect the vibrations because all the parts are sealed up. That oddity is apparent from testing and inspection during refueling, or in this case, once a leak has taken place. 

“You can’t see or hear the vibration but you inspect during the refueling,” he says. “The fact that these vibrations are occurring is not shoddy workmanship; it is an unusual phenomenon, which is that the direction of the vibration is different.” 

Gillespie says Mitsubishi’s contract with SoCalEd obligates it to address the issue. He said that those discussions are proprietary but there are “multiple fixing options.” He declined to say what it would it cost but SoCalEd has said that it is at least $138 million. The estimated cost of the maintenance and repairs along with the lost revenues could be as much as $700 million. 

Again, he is emphatic that neither Mitsubishi nor SoCalEd knew of the underlying problems leading to the radiation leaks until they became noticeable in 2012. When asked to respond to news reports that had alleged that Mitsubishi discovered the problems in 2009, revealing them to the utility at that time, and then choosing to “fix” the issues rather than install new parts, Gillespie said they were “untrue.” 

The Mitsubishi executive said that whether SoCalEd chose to repair the problem or to install new parts, it would still require public hearings before the NRC. “Fixing” the issue still mandates companies to notify after the fact the NRC and installing new equipment necessitates that utilities discuss it ahead of time with regulators. There is no regulatory advantage to choosing one option over another, he adds. 

“The premature wear of the steam generator tubes at San Onofre was not identified until January 2012, when a leak occurred in one tube of one of the SONGS Unit 3 steam generators,” says Megan Jordan, vice president of corporate communications for SoCalEd, in a letter regarding this reporter previous work. “The vibration and wear phenomenon that caused this leak was unexpected.”

She emphasizes that the utility “would never, and did not, install generators that it believed would not perform safely.”

Further Exploration

Both the NRC and the SEC should be able to get to the bottom of this issue. In a late night email in which neither Mitsubishi nor SoCalEd have had time to respond, this reporter asked several other questions that are ripe for further exploration:

-- Does Mitsubishi’s role extend beyond sales and does it include service and maintenance?

-- Or, more precisely, who installs and services the equipment? 

-- Who monitors the day-to-day activities at the plant? SCE? 

-- What is the working relationship between Mitsubishi Heavy and SCE and what is the breakdown between who does what at the plant?

-- Are there other vendors with a hand in servicing and maintenance?

-- Are there maintenance logs as to whom did what work at these steam generators between the time of installation in 2009 and when the leaks were discovered in 2012?

-- Could not regulators access those records and interview the relevant workers? Could they not dig into their emails and phone calls to see if there are any records of them reporting any problems or having any suspicions that something may be awry inside those vessels?

-- Would you be willing to share the relevant information as it pertains to any other investigations that may now be occurring, specifically as it relates to the California Public Utility Commission? Are there any depositions or interrogatories that may help clear up some of these questions? 

-- Would the issues that occurred at SONGS with respect to the unusual vibrations and the configuration of the steam generators be applicable to any other unit elsewhere in the world? Are you examining those units right now?

-- Finally, have there been any subsequent repairs or improvements in design with respect to steam generators and the vessels in question? 

SoCalEd wants to restart Unit 2 and rev it up to 70 percent of its capacity. It’s unlikely to do this by summer. The company has said that if it can’t do so by the end of 2013, it may permanently shut down both reactors. The problems at Unit 3 are more complicated and any resolution to them could be prolonged.

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