How A Potential Fukushima Sites 30 Miles From NYCClaire Bernish (The Pontiac Tribune) – An explosion at the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC), a nuclear plant located a few hundred feet from the Hudson River in Westchester, New York, sent a fireball over 650 feet into the air. Entergy Corporation, which runs the plant, said the explosion triggered a safe shut down of the Number 3 reactor, though the Number 2 reactor remains in operation. A resulting fire was extinguished by a sprinkler system and on – site fire brigade personnel. Did this make you jump? In this case, there is no lingering public safety concern, because the explosion happened when an oil – cooled transformer situated roughly 300 feet from the reactor, failed; and though the exact cause is not yet known, transformer failure is a relatively common occurrence in the industry, happening roughly 3 – 4 times a year according to director of the Nuclear Safety Project, Dave Lochbaum. But there is something of grave concern scheduled to begin shortly, and its close proximity to the aging nuclear plant — which at one time found itself on the list of the nation’s worst — has largely escaped coverage by the corporate media. Oh, did I mention IPEC is located in a seismic zone? When contemplating risk, there is an assumption that the factors under consideration will lead to an informed decision in answering the question: Is it worth it? The Algonquin Incremental Market Project (AIM) is a glaring example of an entire industry hellbent on ignoring that essential question altogether. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), with approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), gave the green light on plans for Spectra Corporation to construct a 42″, high – pressure natural gas pipeline which will run through the IPEC facility, less than a quarter mile — at one critical point just 105 feet — from the No 2 and No 3 reactors. But that’s only the beginning of the folly characterizing the AIM pipeline expansion, a project intended to pump fracked shale gas from Pennsylvania into New England. Spectra, a giant in the natural gas infrastructure industry, has been seeking the addition to its 1,129 mile long Algonquin Pipeline since 2011. Though the project gained approval, how it managed to do, is a feat that defies logic entirely. Working with the NRC from its outset, engineer Paul Blanch is a nuclear energy proponent with decades of experience in nuclear safety and federal regulation, and holds security clearance for his job — by all accounts an industry ‘insider’. His take on the AIM project should carry weight:
Gas is a volatile, explosive substance, and the pipelines tasked with transporting it are subject to corrosion and neglect, making maintenance and inspection the highest priority. However, a report [pdf] by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in January found operators had“inadequate evaluation of threats […] which may lead to underestimating the true magnitude of risks to a pipeline”, compounded by “inspectors [who] lack training to effectively verify the validity of an operator’s risk assessment”. With that in mind, an increase in the number of ‘incidents’ (read: accidents) in high – consequence areas (HCA), which are locations where injury and property damage are likely to occur, really comes as no surprise. And yet, Indian Point could qualify as the area of the highest consequences possible . . . New York City, with some 20 million people, sits just 37 miles to its south. Why does this pipeline have approval? With the human element on precarious footing, measures like automatic shutoff of the pipeline in case of rupture, leak, or explosion, seem like a no – brainer; but these electronic safety features were somehow deemed unnecessary by both FERC and the NRC. So what is the safety plan? Spectra will monitor the pipeline from a control room in Houston, some 1,000 miles away, claiming employees could close safety valves within three minutes of noticing a drop in pressure. According to Richard Kuprewicz, a pipeline safety and regulatory adviser and incident investigator, a three minute shut off for a pipeline of the size and pressure the AIM extension will have, is impossible. The sheer volume of gas pumping through such lines would shoot outfaster than the speed of sound, and multiple explosions are almost certain. In the moments after an explosion, confusion inevitably ensues. Delays in monitoring equipment after such a rupture are likely, and even closing the safety valves could take a minimum of twenty minutes though fires can burn long afterward. In addition, the quantity of gas feeding the fire depends on location of a rupture, and since valves are placed at three mile intervals, a rupture between them would mean three miles of fuel for such a fire, but if that were to occur at the site of the valve, the quantity doubles. He explained from experience,
Though it might seem unlikely, Paul Blanch, the nuclear expert, says the concern is legitimate:
Why does this pipeline have approval? From the time it became operational on June 26, 1973, the IPEC facility has been plagued with problems. Two pipelines, circa 1951, run just 600 feet from the plant, and although the Atomic Energy Commission (now NRC) gave assurance at the time IPEC was constructed, that “Failures of these gas lines will not impair the [reactor’s] safe operation”, those lines have no maintenance requirements. Neither the two old pipelines, nor the new AIM installation will require assessment pursuant to relicensing for the IPEC plant, which is in the works and will grant operation for an additional forty years. Activists, concerned citizens, and even Gov Andrew Cuomo, have made an exhaustive effort to have the facility shut down, with no success. Now back to risk assessment. For evaluation of the AIM project, Entergy hired a one – time employee of one of the plant’s former owners, who submitted his assessment to the NRC in August 2014. The report was so flawed, that just one month after it was made public in October, Blanch petitioned the NRC to “take enforcement action” against Entergy for“providing inaccurate and incomplete information” to the commission, and demanded an explanation from the company. In his petition, Blanch wrote:
Kuprewicz called the assessment “seriously deficient and inadequate”, and in a letter to Blanch, included with the petition, he elaborated:
Why does this pipeline have approval? One of the most glaring flaws in the risk assessment on which approval was given, pertains to modeling based on an outdated EPA computer program called ALOHA, which couldn’t account for the type of rupture likely to happen with a 42″ pipe. Using this program for the assessment in this case, was even prohibited by the EPA, itself, because, as the agency stated, it “cannot model gas release from a pipe that has broken in the middle and is leaking from both broken ends” (emphasis by EPA). But perhaps the most egregious — and consequently the most dangerous — error, is a calculation derived from the chance of total pipeline rupture, which the NRC gave a 1% chance of occurrence — despite accompanying documentation that clearly puts the risk at 20%. Based on the much smaller figure, the official risk assessment states that the odds for pipeline rupture to trigger a nuclear meltdown fall within NRC guidelines, at 7 in 100 million years. Blanch recalculated, accounting for pipeline size, velocity of gas streaming through, and the higher and accurate total rupture risk of 20%. In actuality, a nuclear meltdown would be triggered one in every 1,000 years, which, as he states, is “an unacceptable probability and a clear violation of NRC regulations.”
Senators Charles Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand called for a “thorough, independent review of all the projects potential impacts”, as have Rep Nita Lowey and NY State Assemblywoman Sandy Gelaf. But the FERC ignored all of these requests, siding with the NRC’s approval based on the horribly flawed assessment by Entergy. Though the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission describes itself as “independent”, it sides with the industry the majority of the time, and in this case, appears to have completely lost touch with the reality of such an incredibly risky situation. Blanch explained how preposterous this project is, when considering its close proximity to New York City:
So, why does this pipeline have approval?
Source(s): pontiactribune.com http://www.healthfreedoms.org/how-a-potential-fukushima-sites-30-miles-from-nyc/ |