Analysis of the USS Fitzgerald Disaster

OBSERVATIONS:

1.This was not a glancing blow, a sideswipe of two ships passing in the night. It was a direct, frontal, perpendicular hit of the Crystal against the mid-right side (starboard) of the Fitzgerald.

2. It happened at around 2:30 a.m. local time. Even if visibility by the naked eye was very low, how could the persons manning the radar systems of both ships not have detected the impending collision as it was developing and advised their captains to take immediate, evasive action?
 
3. From the maps and descriptions of the courses of the two vessels during the time leading up to the collision that I have seen, it is difficult to make sense of the directionality and turns of the vessels in their aggregate. “ While the cause of the accident has yet to be determined, Japan’s public broadcaster NHK said the ACX Crystal had made a sharp turn shortly before the collision.” (report in The Guardian 18 hours ago)

4. Reports indicate that the entrance to the harbor is usually clogged with a high concentration of ships, and there are islands that need to be avoided. In such challenging circumstances, extraordinary caution is required at the best of times. This is especially true for mammoth vessels that are difficult to maneuver (they are not nimble, to say the least).

5. The bulbous underwater part of the Crystal’s bow appears to have ruptured the Fitzgerald’s hull beneath the surface of the water, which resulted in the F taking on water and listing despite extensive pumping action. More seriously, the upper, projecting part of the C’s bow, which was aimed directly (here I am making no claim of intentionality) at the F’s bridge and penetrated rather deeply into the F’s superstructure, caused tremendous damage and apparently threw sailors who were standing in that area into the sea (seven crew members of the F were found in a flooded compartment). In terms of mass and bulk, this crashing of the C against the F has been described as resembling that of a freight train plowing into a school bus.
 
6. The C sustained minimal damage in the upper part of the port side of the bow, right near the front. Early this morning it was seen passing by Yokosuka, “visible at a distance from Chili’s. Steaming at a decent clip for a cargo ship.” (from an onsite observer)
 
QUESTIONS:
1. Structurally, which is more vulnerable, the side of a ship or the bow?
 
2. Who was at the helms of the two ships at the moment of impact and during the last ten minutes leading up to the collision?
 
3. Were the captain, officers, and crew members of the Crystal actually Japanese?

It is possible that the M.V. ACX Crystal had turned 180 to avoid a close CPA (Closest Point of Approach) with another ship and ended up heading South in the traffic lane among other ships. Having resolved her close contact issue, she then turned abruptly to resume her Northerly course and struck the Fitzgerald in the turn.
 
Fitzgerald’s tracking probably held the Crystal’s Southerly heading (and held her overtaking or being overtaken by Fitzgerald) but with the number of other contacts in the area, Fitzgerald might not have immediately noted and inputted the Crystal’s turn to resume her Northerly course.
 
Before the OOD knew it the DDG was in extremis with the ACX Crystal.
 
What action the OOD took in extremis will not be public knowledge until the investigation is concluded.
 
The Navy Emergency Shiphandling Course taught me that when in extremis act because you will have a 50% chance of avoiding collision. Not acting means 100% chance of collision.
 
Knowing now that the CO was in his cabin means to me that the OOD felt he had the situation in hand or that the collision happened so quickly the CO couldn’t be notified.
 
The fact that the CO was in his rack tells me he was 1) convinced the OOD was competent in handling the ship in congested waters or 2) a fool for not being on the bridge.
 
Since Cdr Benson had been a CO previously, and this was his second command, I am convinced that he was no fool.
 
Circumstances often conspire against a shipdriver, even the most forehanded ones.

It is a tragedy that sailors were killed in the collision and the only positive part of the accident was the professional and rapid response of Fitzgerald’s damage control teams in ensuring she didn’t flood and founder. Theirs was a superlative and highly laudable response and outcome.

 

https://medium.com/@JackPosobiec/analysis-of-the-uss-fitzgerald-disaster-a66c8033085d